NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SUBCONCLUSIONS:
a. If the FEC should withdraw from South Vietnam, other forces would be needed to fill the vacuum.
b. If other forces are used to fill the vacuum, the Viet-Minh will overtly intervene.
c. If U.S. ground forces are not included in these "other" forces, the Viet-Minh will emerge victorious.
d. Viet-Minh paramilitary activities in South Viet-Nam cannot be overcome by using those methods which have proven successful in other areas, i.e. the Philippines.
8. In considering the acceptability of the loss of Viet-Nam from the U.S. viewpoint, U.S. policy objectives related to the entire Far East, Southeast Asia and South Asia would have to be reviewed. The military implications of the loss of South Viet-Nam have to take into account the probably ensuing political developments, i.e. a Communist takeover in Laos and Cambodia with a resultant weakening of Thailand's will to resist Communism, and at a minimum the strengthening of the naturalist tendencies in the other other countries of the area.
SUBCONCLUSION: The loss of Viet-Nam and subsequent political developments would render the military defense of the remainder os Southeast Asia extremely difficult, if not impossible.
9. In considering the question of elections, the assumption that the Viet-Minh would not agree to free elections could well be erroneous despite the consistent rejection of election proposals for the unification of Germany, Austria and Korea. In other countries, the Communist control only a minority of the population, whereas in Viet-Nam they control the majority. In addition, they have residual popular support in areas outside
