Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/283

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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25 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

SUBJECT: Department of State Debriefing of General Collins


General Collins was debriefed by Department of State representatives, commencing at 1000 Friday, 22 April. Also present at this debriefing were representatives of Defense, FOA, CIA, USIA, and Treasury.

The problems discussed were primarily political in nature and the objective of the discussion was to arrive at a solution to the current governmental situation in South Viet-Nam. However, two problems of interest to the Department of Defense - financial support of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) and integration of Sect forces into the Vietnamese National Army - were also discussed.

In the political phase of the discussion, the various proposals which have been made during recent weeks were analyzed and the following points are considered to be of interest:

a. General Collins stated that:
(1) In his opinion it would be a major error judgement to continue to support a man (Diem) who has demonstrated such a marked inability to understand the political, economic and military problems associated with Viet-Nam.
(2) Diem is currently governing by himself, based on the advice of his brothers and a few close friends (Ministers of Justice, Finance, and Information.)
(3) Diem simple cannot get along with other capable men.
(4) Diem, in five months, has not had one original constructive suggestion, idea, or plan. General Collins and Ely have been responsible for any of those which appeared to originate with Diem.
(5) Doctor Quat and former Foreign Minister Bo are the most able men available in South Viet-Nam.
(6) General elections in South Viet-Nam are not possible and the best form of government for this country would be a constitutional monarchy. The Vietnamese are not, and will not be in the immediate future, ready for a republican form of government.
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