Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/295

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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4746, APRIL 30, 8 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 1 OF 2)

to fetch him that his status as Prime Minister remained unaltered. Bao Dai regarded present crisis as being in to phases: first, to bring about end of present civil war and second to deal with question of governmental reform. First would have to be settled now, second could be dealt with later.

5. Thenceforth, and in conversation immediately following with Bao Dai interview concerned with Bao Dai's, observations on how to put end civil war rather than any questions alternate govt or other aspects Bao Dai "plan".

6. Bao Dai stated in strong terms he wished U.S. to take immediate steps persuade die to come to France to receive Vietnamese leaders with him and discuss means ending present crisis. He stated that correctly, or incorrectly. Diem has claimed that he has had U.S. support in steps he has taken during last few weeks which have led to present bloodshed. He violated truce and at least his brothers if not he himself claimed that he did so with at least passive U.S. support was already being said, Bao Dai claimed, that U.S. had "by its refusal to countenance any action but blind support for Diem allowed present abcess to fester until it had burst in form present civil war and that U.S. had purposely done this in hope Diem would take armed action. This action had resulted in deaths of hundreds of innocent people and waste of national force needed to fight communism. U.S. in action could no longer be admitted".

7. All of this we denied, pointing out again that General Collins and Embassy Saigon has consistently urged restraint on govt. Bao Dai continued stating that U.S. responsibility in present situation was heavy. He had put off taking action he had wished to take which might have served to avoid present bloodshed at U.S. request. On two successive days U.S. had asked him to refrain from taxing decisive action on excuse Washington was studying problem with General Collins there and would have something to say shortly. On April 26 and 27 Bao Dai had agreed to our requests and had not taken action

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