NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
| FROM: | Paris. |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO. | SECTO 8, May 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) |
PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716.
what to do in face of present situation. He summarized present situation as follows:
(1) There is a revolutionary movement under way in Vietnam,
(2) We believe that Diem has the best chance of anyone of staying on top of revolution and keeping it within "tolerable" limits. Diem is only means US sees to save South Vietnam and counteract revolution. US sees no one else who can. Whatever US view has been in past, today US must support Diem wholeheartedly. US must not permit Diem to become another Karensky.
Regarding Bao Dai, Secretary said in his view he had irretrievably lost capacity to be anything but titular head of government if even that position could be saved for him and that this was solution Secretary preferred until election (of National Assembly). Bao Dai should support Diem and not take away his power. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao could be used but no Binh Xuyen. Secretary expressed opinion that with support two governments Diem could sit on top of revolution. Diem is only force of moderation. FEC a certain stabilizing influence. US was giving funds to support Vietnamese Army and could not see anyone else to give funds to but Diem for that purpose. Concluded by stating that support of Diem was only way he could see to deal with common problem pointing out that time was running against us and no successful results could be achieved unless two countries worked together.
Meeting was then joined by British for whom Secretary resumed US position as summarized above adding that in US view present revolution is not yet dominated or influenced by Communists to any appreciable degree. He remarked that prior association with Communists was not in itself sufficient reason to believe that man was a Communist now, citing that Bao Dai himself could be considered a Communist on this reasoning. Support of Diem did not indicate US non-recognition of his weaknesses. US had not taken part in his original selection and had been and remained ready to support any other man who might be presented by orderly process of law. He remarked that just before outbreak of fighting US was prepared to consider alternatives but he was not sure now that it would have been practical. Secretary remarked he was told last March by Collins that we had already reached point of no return on Diem.
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