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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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V.B.3. (Book III)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| The Geneva Accords - 1960 | Page | |
| 185. | The State Department explains the rationale of why the United States issued'a unilateral declaration instead of signing the 1954 Accords on Indochina. Secretary Dulles was unwilling to even consider signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva, and hence was not an alternative to issuing a unilateral declaration but was as a substitute suggested by the French leaders. The declaration was based on the understandings of the 14 July Franco-American Six Point position paper. State Department Analysis - Geneva Declaration | 676 |
| 186. | The NSC adopts the JCS recommendation that the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina be kept under review. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to JCS, 30 July 1954 | 679 |
| 187. | Dulles reviews the occasions when French officials suggested U.S. armed intervention in Indochina and the parallel U.S. efforts to organize "united action." The possibility of "united action" lapsed in mid-June 1954 with the French decision to obtain a cease-fire at Geneva. Dulles 689 to London; 3 August 1954 | 680 |
| 188. | The CIA assesses the probable outlook in Indochina in the light of agreements at the Geneva Conference. The conclusions are: (1)that the communists will continue to pursue their objectives in South Vietnam by political, psychological and paramilitary means; (2) that if elections are held in 1956, the Viet Minh will win; (3) and that the events in Laos and Cambodia depend on the developments in Vietnam. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954 | 691 |
| 189. | The French view of Diem Government is that it does not qualify on three major points: (1) fully representative of the population; (2) prepared to carry out land reform; and (3) prepared to depose Bao Dai. Diem is seen as valuable for his high moral character but his mandarin background precludes his qualifications on the three points. Paris 481 to Dulles, 4 August 1954 | 699 |
| 190. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that before the U.S. assume responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army that four preconditions be met: (1) "it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control"; (2) each government concerned should formally request the U.S. to assume the responsibility; (3) arrangements should be made for |
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