NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C .
SECRET
12 August 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- Subject: Message to the French Prime Minister
1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 11 August 1954, which requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to a Department of State draft of a proposed message to the Prime Minister of France regarding United States policy toward Indochina.
2. In their memorandum to you dated 4 August 1954, subject: "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina", the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered should be met before the United States assumes responsibility for training the forces of the Associated States. Particularly pertinent to the consideration of the proposed message are two preconditions which, in substance, prescribed:
- a. The existence of a reasonably strong, stable Government capable of performing those functins essential to the successful raising and maintenance of its armed forces; and
- b. The granting by France of full independence to the Associated States and arrangements for the eventual phased withdrawal of French forces, officials and advisers from Indochina, in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of national armed forces.
3. The JoInt Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the above conditions can be said to exist now. The tenure of the present government in Vietnam appears to be in doubt and subject to final determination by the French as to the eventual composition of that government. Until this matter has been definitely resolved, the strength and stability of the Vietnam Government wi11 hardly be such as to hold promise of providing the firm
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