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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 210. | The U.S. and France agree to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist nationalist government. The five key elements recognized which can provide a chance of success are: Bao Dai, General Hinh and the National army, and the three sects. The Binh Xuyen sect, which controls the police and is tied to Bao Dai, is to be isolated from Bao Dai and their strength minimized. TOSEC 9, 30 September 1954 | 765 |
| 211. | Secretary Dulles feels that U.S. policy on the magnitude of force levels and costs for Vietnam should be based on NSC 5429/2 which provides for internal security forces under SEATO: "….it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of forces we consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina." Dulles Letter to Wilson, 11 October 1954 | 768 |
| 212. | Defense forwards Secretary Dulles letter (Document 204, page 746) to JCS and requests the JCS to reconsider their previous estimates (Document 202, page 742) in light of the more recent views of Dulles. ISA Memorandum for JCS, 14 October 1954 | 770 |
| 213. | The JCS, in reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 11 October (Document 210, page 765), persist in their view that the U.S. should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces. However, if "political considerations are overriding," then the JCS agree to assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon "with safeguards against French interference…." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 October 1954 | 771 |
| 214. | Dulles reports on a conversation with Mendes-France on the critical situation in Vietnam. The French position is that plans should be laid for another government structure in the event of a Diem failure. They stress the importance of utilizing the "thread of legitimacy deriving from Baa Dai…." Dulles requests the State Department estimate on the political situation. DULTE 5, 20 October 1954 | 775 |
| 215. | A new approach to leadership training and "cross-fertilization between Western and Asiatic ideas" is proposed in a psychological operations concept entitled "Militant Liberty." The implementation of "Militant Liberty" -- a concept which "motivates indigenous people to work toward a common goal of individual freedom" -- is proposed on a test basis in Indochina as a joint military-CIA venture. Defense Memo for the CIA (Draft), 20 October 1954 | 776 |
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