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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


1961 MAY 181236
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


May 18, 1961


MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: U. S. Combat Force s for Vietnam


The following sums up the information made available to me on the possible deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.

Use:

On 10 May, the JCS recommended that President Diem be encouraged to request that the U.S. fulfill its SEATO obligation, in view of the new threat imposed by the Laotian situation, by the immediate deployment of appropriate U.S. forces to South Vietnam. Details of size and composition of suitable forces were awaiting the views of CINCPAC and CHMAAG.

On 12 May, this subject was discussed by President Diem and Vice President Johnson in Saigon. Ambassador Nolting reported this discussion, noting that President Diem would desire U.S. (or SEATO) combat forces only in case of overt aggression. The introduction of foreign combat forces would contravene and signify the end of the Geneva accord. (General Williams, former MAAG Chief, agrees that this is in line with previous thinking by President Diem.)

Ambassador Nolting added that President Diem would welcome as many U.S. military personnel as needed for training and advising Vietnamese forces. General McGarr, Chief of MAAG who was present at this discussion also, reported that while President Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of fighting Communists in South Vietnam, he would accept deployment of U.S. combat forces as trainers for the Vietnamese forces at any time.

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