The Kennedy Administration: January 1961 - November 1963
Contents and Chronological List of Documents
1961
Page
1.
General Lansdale reports on his January visit to Vietnam: "The U.S. should recognize "that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war…" He recommends strong support for Diem personally as the best available South Vietnamese leader, and the prompt transfer of Ambassador Durbrow, whose relations with Diem are poor. Memo for Secretary of Defense, 17 January 1961
1
2.
Embassy Saigon is advised that Kennedy has approved Counter-Insurgency Plan (prepared by previous Administration) calling for increases in U.S. support for Vietnamese armed forces, contingent on reforms by Diem. State to Saigon 1054, 3 February 1961
14
3.
The President requests the SecDef to examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter guerrilla forces. NSAM 2, 3 February 1961
17
4.
The Secretary of Defense is instructed to report his views on actions in the near future to launch guerrilla operations in Viet Minh territory. NSAM 28, 9 March 1961
18
5.
The JCS comment on the recommendations of Lt Gen Trapnell. In addition to the Trapnell recommendations, the JCS suggest that the U.S. provide Defense support funds on the same basis for 170,000 forces as for 150,000; that the U.S. provide MAP support for the entire 68,000-man Civil Guard; and that the U.S. exploit these contributions to induce the GVN to accept the Counter Insurgency Plan. Memorandum reflects conflict of views between MAAG and Embassy in Saigon. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense , JCSM 228-61, 11 April 1961
19
6.
Unsigned paper, apparently by Lansdale, proposes a Presidential directive organizing a Task Force to come up with an approved plan of action in Vietnam. The goals of U.S. policy in Vietnam fall into three interrelated parts: (1) pacification, (2) stabilization and (3) unification of Vietnam under anti-communist government. Tasks are outlined in this memorandum to accomplish these three goals. Paper in Deputy Secretary of Defense Task Force file, 19 April 1961
22
7.
General Lansdale provides a detailed description of President Diem and his family apparently intended for Vice President Johnson's use. Lansdale first met Diem in Saigon in 1954. "Here is our toughest ally … a 60-year old bachelor who gave up romance with his childhood sweetheart…to devote his life to his country." Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, 25 April 1961
36
8.
In view of the serious military deterioration within South Vietnam and in order to accomplish the U.S. objective of preventing communist domination of the South, this first draft of the Vietnam Task Force report calls for a comprehensive political, economic and military program of U.S. support. Among other recommendations are an increase in MAAG and MAP and a visit by the Vice President in the near future. Task Force Draft "Program of Action," 26 April 1961
42
9.
The effect of a political settlement in Laos would be (1) to inhibit U.S. assistance in preventing a communist take-over in SVN; and (2) to permit an expansion of the VC effort in SVN owing to the greater possibilities for uninhibited infiltration; and (3) give complete control to the North Vietnamese of the three passes through the Annamite Mountains. With an expanded training program in SVN, however, the GVN should be able to defend itself even in the event of a Laotian settlement. Second Draft "Laos Annex" to Task Force report, 28 April 1961
58
10.
Attorney General Kennedy asks the question "Where would be the best place to stand and fight in SEA -- where -- to draw the line?" Secretary McNamara thinks the best place to take a stand is in Thailand and SVN. General Decker thinks there is no good place to fight in SEA. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 29 April 1961
62
11.
Secretary Rusk decides at this meeting at the State Department that "We should not place combat forces in SVN at this time." Colonel Robert M. Levy Memorandum for Record, 5 May 1961
67
12.
Final Draft of the Task Force Report recommends sending U.S. Battle Groups and an Engineer Battalion for training purposes; the assignment of coastal patrol missions to CINCPACFLT; and the air surveillance and close-support role to CINCPACAF. It also recommends the Vice-Presidential trip, a letter to Diem from Kennedy, increased MAP and other assistance, and a general U.S. commitment to support of Diem. Final Draft Task Force Report "A Program of Action," 6 May 1961
69
13.
OSD requests the JCS to review and study the military advisability of possible commitment of U.S. forces to SVN. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Chairman, JCS, 8 May 1961.
131
14.
President Kennedy provides Vice President Johnson with a personal letter to present to President Diem. Kennedy suggests that, in addition to actions in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, the U.S. is prepared to: (1) augment the personnel of MAAG. (2) expand MAG's duties, (3) provide MAP support for the Civil Guard, and (4) provide support for the Vietnamese Junk Force. President Kennedy letter to President Diem, 8 May 1961
132
15.
The President makes the following decisions: (1) the U.S. objective is to prevent communist domination of SVN and to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, (2) the President directs full examination of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam, (3) finally, the President approves continuation of the special Task Force on Vietnam. The decisions of this NSAM are based on the report "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of SVN." NSAM 52, 11 May 1961
136
16.
President Diem asserts that the recent developments in Laos emphasize the grave Vietnamese concern for the security of their country with its long and vulnerable frontiers. President Diem states that "as a small nation we cannot hope to meet all of our defense needs alone…" and expresses confidence that the Vietnamese needs will be given consideration in Washington. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, 15 May 1961
155
17.
Lansdale summarizes information on the possible deployment of U.S. combat forces in VN. He refers to a conversation between Diem and Vice President Johnson on the subject.
"Much of the thinking has been on stationing U.S. combat forces in the high plateau…however, General Williams has written a brief memorandum to me recommending such U.S. forces to be stationed on the coast…" Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 18 May 1961
157
18.
The Vice President reports on his mission to SEA. Johnson feels, on the basis of his visit, that the situation in Laos has created doubt and concern about U.S. intentions throughout all of SEA. "No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this." It is Johnson's impression that his mission arrested the decline of confidence in the U.S. "We didn't buy time -- we were given it. If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know -- without bothering to ask -- that there would be no further extensions of my note." The fundamental decision required of the U.S. is whether we are to attempt a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or "throw in the towel." Johnson recommends "we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action." Vice President Johnson Memorandum to President Kennedy, 23 May 1961
159
19.
President Diem sends the U.S. a study on Vietnamese needs to meet the insurgency situation in the South. Diem suggests that, in light of the current situation, an additional 100,000 men above the new force level of 170,000 will be required to counter the threat of communist domination. Diem recommends a considerable expansion of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in SVN as an essential requirement, and, finally, Diem expresses his mistrust of Sihanouk's communist sympathies and antagonism of SVN. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, 5 June 1961
167
20.
President Kennedy requests that the Secretary of Defense estimate requirements and make recommendations with respect to the anticipated future U.S. needs in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. NSAM 56, 28 June 1961
174
21.
Lansdale relates a conversation between Vice President Tho and Colonel Black. In discussing the Staley Mission, Tho concedes that it is impossible for the U.S. to provide SVN with piastres. The GVN feels an increase in piastre return per dollar would cause inflation and, in turn, an inevitable demand for wage increases. Tho further concedes that the basic problem in VN is more political than economic. Tho's impression of the current situation in SVN is more pessimistic
than that of the Americans. Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 12 July 1961
175
22.
Mr. William P. Bundy forwards the joint action program proposed by the GVN-US Special Financial Group to the Assistant Secretary of Defense. The report prepared by Dr. Eugene Staley, Chairman of the Group, has been submitted to President Ngo Diem and President John F. Kennedy, and includes the fiscal and economic implications of increasing the Vietnamese armed forces to 200,000 strength. The military portions, in addition to the requirements already planned, would require approximately $42 million during the 18-month period, July 61-December 62. Bundy Memorandum to Gilpatric, 25 July 1961, (Staley Report attached)
177
23.
General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG-Vietnam, reviews the military situation and offers recommendations for continued improvement of the situation in SVN to President Diem. Among the recommendations made by McGarr are: (1) that a national internal security council be established to prepare and execute the Vietnamese National Counter Insurgency Plan; (2) that effective border and coastal surveillance capabilities be initiated; (3) that U.S. advisers be more effectively utilized by accompanying ARVN units on combat operations; and (4) finally, that the reorganization of the military command structure and establishment of a single chain of command be implemented as recommended in the Counter Insurgency Plan. Aide-Memoire for President Diem, received Secretary of Defense, 2 August 1961
227
24.
The JCS do not believe that an alternate force of 270,000 would be required to enable the RVNAF to conduct counter-insurgency operations and, concurrently, be prepared to meet overt aggression. They recommend that the strategic force objectives for VN remain at the 9 division level (200,000) subject to further assessment. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 518-61, 3 August 1961
239
25.
The President approves the Staley recommendations and decides that the U.S. will provide equipment and training assistance for an increased RVNAF from 170,000 to 200,000. It is hoped that President Diem will get the maximum mileage in terms of internal political support from this new commitment, and that he will involve more elements of the non-communist political opposition in the civic action program. NSAM 65, 11 August 1961
241
26.
The situation in North and South VN is analyzed and the scope of the communist threat to SVN is estimated for the following year. The analysis concludes that the DRV is in thorough political control in North VN and "when Ho is no longer active, there will probably be a struggle for power between the Moscow-oriented and the Peking-oriented elements of the Party." Dissatisfaction continues in South VN with Diem's leadership. The Army continues to be a major factor in future political developments in the South. The outlook is for a prolonged and difficult struggle between the VC insurgents and the GVN. NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 August 1961
245
27.
The President approves the following actions: (1) intensification of diplomatic efforts to achieve Souvanna's agreement to the Paris proposals; (2 authorization to undertake conversations with SEATO allies on an enlargement of the concept of SEATO Plan 5; and (3) an increase in U.S. advisors in Laos. NSAM 80, 29 August 1961
247
28.
The JCS sends the Secretary of Defense a draft memorandum for the President on military intervention in Laos. The JCS suggests that if the President decides that U.S. forces should be employed in Laos, that SEATO Plan 5 is the proper basic vehicle for the contemplated action. The political objective of the intervention is to confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a military force of Asian and Western powers capable of stopping the communist advance. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 661-61, 20 September, 1961
249
29.
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research assesses the crisis in South VN and analyzes the short term prospects. The study recognizes that communist progress toward its objective of overthrowing President Diem has been substantial. Since 1960, more than 6,500 civilians, officers, and military personnel have been killed or kidnapped. Recent U.S. support has raised Diem's political stature, but there has been no conclusive reversal of deteriorating trends. The security situation remains unimproved. However, the Government's comprehensive CIP, supported by U.S. aid, is beginning to show favorable results. Over the next year, developments in Laos may have more influence on VN than any improvement in the Diem Government. Department of State Research Memorandum RFE-1, 29 September 1961
258
30.
It is estimated that present armed, full-time VC strength is about 16,000, an increase of 12,000 since April of 1960,
and of 4,000 in the past three months. While only 10–20% of this strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North VN, the remaining 80–90% includes remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during the 1954–1955 regroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese communist army units following the Indo-China War. Though some weapons and equipment have been infiltrated into South VN, there has been no positive identification of Communist Bloc-manufactured military equipment in South VN. SNIE 53-2~61, 5 October 1961
291
31.
The JCS feel the time is now past when actions short of intervention by outside forces can reverse the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. They consider the execution of SEATO Plan 5, or a suitable variation thereof, to be the military minimum commensurate with the situation. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 704-61, 5 October 1961
295
32.
It is the opinion of the JCS that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along the whole South VN border, i.e., over several hundred miles, is not feasible. Further, the alternative of using SEATO forces to cover solely the 17th parallel is militarily unsound. "What is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout SEA, but rather a consolidated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken…" A limited interim course of action is provided herewith in the event SEATO Plan 5 is considered politically unacceptable. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 716-61, 9 October 1961
297
33.
"For what one man's feel is worth, mine -- based on very close touch with Indo-China in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards until Diem took hold -- is that it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Vietcong." Bundy suggests that an early, hard-hitting operation has a 70% chance of success. "The 30% is that we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would, myself, favor going in." Bundy memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 10 October 1961
312
34.
It is estimated that the Communist Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a large-scale military attack against South VN or Laos in response to an assumed SEATO action to patrol the GVN coast
and secure the border involving about 25,000 men. Neutralist governments in SEA would be most concerned at the increased tension and danger of general hostilities. Nationalist China would be elated with the SEATO action. SNIE 10-3-6, 10 October 1961
313
35.
At a meeting with President Kennedy, the following actions were agreed upon: (1) the Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron to VN; (2) General Maxwell Taylor will leave for SVN on a Presidential mission; and (3) the State Department will pursue specific political actions, i.e., protest to the ICC on North VN support of the VC; table a White Paper at the UN; and consult with our SEATO allies regarding support in VN. Gilpatric Memorandum for Record, 11 October 1961
322
36.
"With respect to training the Vietnamese Army for the 'wrong war', it seems clear that in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control. All of the Vietnamese Army successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition in organized battalion strength…This change in the situation has not been fully understood by many U.S. officials. In this regard, there is some concern that the Thompson Mission may try to sell the Malayan concept of police control without making a sufficiently careful evaluation of conditions in South Vietnam." JCS Memorandum for General Taylor, CM-390-61, 12 October 1961
324
37.
The President requests that General Taylor proceed to Saigon to appraise the situation in South Vietnam and to report his views on the courses of action which the U.S. might take to avoid further deterioration in the situation and eventually to eliminate the threat to the independence of South Vietnam. President Kennedy letter to General Taylor, 13 October 1961
327
38.
The President directs the following actions be taken: (1) make preparations for the publication of the White Paper on North Vietnamese aggression; (2) develop plans for presentation of the VN case in the UN; (3) introduce the Jungle Jim Squadron into SVN for the purpose of training Vietnamese forces. He indicates that General Taylor should undertake a mission to Saigon. NSAM 104, 13 October 1961
328
39.
It is the conclusion of the DoD General Counsel that the proposed introduction of U.S. combat and logistic forces into VN would constitute violations of Articles 16 and 17 of the
Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in VN of July 20, 1954. Introduction of U.S. troops even for purposes of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of VN. If a decision is made to send U.S. troops into VN, the U.S. should justify it on the ground of collective self-defense. "Nothing in the Geneva Accords should be read as abridging the inherent right of Vietnam and the United States to take actions in collective self-defense." DoD General Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Hadyn Williams, 26 October 1961
329
40.
General Taylor summarizes the fundamental conclusions of his group and his personal recommendations. Taylor concludes there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that the U.S. is determined to save SEA, and doubt that Diem's methods can defeat the Communist purposes and methods. Taylor recommends that the U.S. Government join with the GVN in a massive joint effort as part of a total mobilization of GVN resources to cope with both the VC and the ravages of the flood. Specifically, the U.S. Government will provide individual administrators, conduct a joint survey of conditions in the provinces, assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters, and finally, offer to introduce into South VN a military Task Force to operate under U.S. military control. General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00005) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961
331
41.
Taylor presents his reasons for recommending the introduction of a U.S. military force into South Vietnam. "I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events…there can be no action so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and government of SVN and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of U.S. forces into SVN." Taylor suggests that the strategic reserve of U.S. forces is seriously weak and that U.S. prestige would be more heavily engaged in SVN by this action. However, the size of the U.S. force introduced need not be great to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect. General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00006) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961
337
42.
The JCS and Secretary McNamara do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced in SVN unless the U.S. is willing to commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of SVN to communism and to support this
commitment by military action and preparation for possible later action.'l'hey recommend that the U.S commit itself to this objective and support the recommendations of General Taylor toward its fulfillment. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 8 November 1961
343
43.
The head of the British Advisory Mission submits to Diem his plan for clearing the VC from the Delta. The central idea is the creation of a network of "strategic hamlets" akin to those employed successfully by Thompson in defeating the communist guerillas in Malaya. R.G.K. Thompson letter to Diem, 11 November 1961
345
44.
Reversing the November 8 Defense recommendation for a commitment of substantial U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam this November 11 Rusk-McNamara memorandum to the President (perhaps prepared at Kennedy's specific direction) escalates the rhetoric regarding U.S. interest in a free South Vietnam, but restricts the military recommendation: (a) employ only support forces now; (b) defer any decision to send "larger organized units with actual or potential direct military missions." Whether Kennedy fully accepted the high-blown statements of U.S. interest and commitment to the GVN is not known. State/Defense Memorandum to the President, 11 November 1961
359
45.
The Joint Staff submits to the Chairman, JCS, briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Security Action Memorandum resulting from the Taylor Mission Report. The military actions indexed pertain to the use of significant and/or substantial U.S. forces, provision of increased airlift, provision of additional equipment and U.S. personnel, provision of training and equipment for the Civil Guard and SDC, and finally, overhaul of the GVN military establishment and command structure. In connection with the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff considers it militarily desirable to pre-position forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units. Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, 14 November 1961
368
46.
Rusk instructs Ambassador Nolting to seek an immediate appointment with President Diem to inform him that President Kennedy has decided that the Government of the U.S. is prepared to join the Government of VN in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid further deterioration in the situation of SVN. The joint effort requires certain undertakings by
both governments. On its part, the U.S. would immediately support the GVN with increased airlift, additional equipment, U.S. personnel, expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and increased economic aid. The GVN, however, would nave to initiate the following actions: (1) begin prompt legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its resources; (2) give governmental wartime agencies adequate authority to perform their functions effectively; and (3) overhaul the military establishment and command structure to create an effective military organization. "President Kennedy contemplates an immediate strong affirmative reply to satisfactory letter along indicated lines from President Diem, which will simultaneously be made public." Rusk NIACT 619 to Saigon, 15 November 1961
400
47.
After three days of talks in Saigon, Ambassador Galbraith feels there is scarcely "the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms being pressed upon Diem will result in real change." Gailbraith sees a comparatively well equipped army of a quarter million men facing 15 to 18,000 lightly armed men "…there is no solution that does not involve a change of government…to say there is no alternative (to Diem) is nonsense." Ambassador Gailbraith Memorandum for the President, 20 November 1961
406
48.
"The key and inescapable point then is the ineffectuality (abetted debatably by the unpopularity) of the Diem Government. This is the strategic factor. Nor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that it is the inevitable posture of the Asian mandarin. For one thing, it isn't true, but were it so, the only possible conclusion would be that there is no future for mandarins . The communists don't favor them." Gailbraith feels that it is politically naive to expect that Diem will reform either administratively or politically in any effective way. "However, having started on this hopeless game, we have no alternative but to play it out for a minimum time…since there is no chance of success, we must do two things to protect our situation. One is to make clear that our commitment is to results and not to promises…and we can press hardest in the area of Army reform where the needed changes are most specific and most urgent." It follows from Gailbraith's reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem, and we should not be alarmed by the Army as an alternative. Gailbraith New Delhi 9941 for President Kennedy, 21 November 1961
410
49.
The U.S. is prepared to join the VN Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation of certain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U.S., based on recommendations of the Taylor Report, NSAM 111, 22 November 1961
419
50.
Bundy comments on the command arrangements for VN and recommends that General McGarr be elevated to the new position or that a replacement be found. He also recommends sending Lansdale back as Diem has requested. Bundy Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 25 November 1961
422
51.
General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key advisors. Among the questions are: (1) what is the situation with regard to Diem as reported by Ambassador Nolting; (2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem; (3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organization required to support the new program; (4) what is our plan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington end of this operation? General Taylor Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 27 November 1961
423
52.
The President approves U.S. participation in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial. NSAM 115, 30 November 1961
425
53.
McNamara confirms to Rusk the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces - Vietnam" and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 18 December 1961
426
54.
Diem is apprehensive about giving control authority to Big Minh as military field commander because of his fear of a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, we must find a way to reassure him about a coup. "It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do and this basic point needs resolving…what realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?" Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 27 December 1961
427
55.
The Chairman of the JCS summarizes the current situation in VN, methods of VC operations, routes of infiltration and supply, relative strengths, and discusses U.S. military units in place or enroute to VN. "The objectives of the Diem Government in SVN include not only survival against the communists, but also improvement of the national economy, enhancement of SVN's position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and preservation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed toward the achievement of these objectives suffer from the concentration of power in the hands of the President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu." Chairman JCS Talking Paper for Briefing President Kennedy, 9 January 1962.
428
56.
The JCS agree that the basic issue of Diem's apprehension about a coup needs to be resolved. "I don't believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn't fully trust." JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-491-62, 18 January 1962
440
57.
The President establishes a Special Group (Counter Insurgency), the functions of which are as follows: (1) to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and other U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (4) to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing or defeating insurgency. NSAM 124, 18 January 1962
442
58.
State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level should be supported provided the following factors are considered: (1) that U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities continue to set valid tactical and strategic plans; (2) the rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army to absorb and train the additional men and the manpower resources of SVN; (3) that the armed forces should level off at 200,000 and further efforts should be devoted to
strengthening the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps; and (4) that our training programs for ARVN be based on the concept that the Vietnamese Army will start winning when it has the confidence of the Vietnamese populace. U. Alexis Johnson letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962
445
59.
Secretary McNamara forwards a JCS Memorandum to the President with the comment, "I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN." The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of SVN armed forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made to deploy suitable U.S. military combat forces to SVN sufficient to achieve desired objectives. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 (JCSM-33-62, 13 January 1962, attached)
447
60.
The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes, and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable. NSAM 132, 19 February 1962
455
61.
The President approves training objectives for personnel who may have a role, to play in counter insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objectives include the study of: the historical background of counter insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive insurgency, instruction in counter insurgency program planning, specialized preparations for service in underdeveloped areas. Training of foreign nationals will also be included in the program. The President desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objectives. NSAM 131, 13 March 1962
457
62.
The President forwards a memorandum on the subject of VN from Ambassador Galbraith and requests Department of Defense comments. The Gailbraith Memorandum (4 April 62) asserts that the U.S. is backing a weak and ineffectual government in SVN and that "there is a consequent danger that we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." Gailbraith urges that U.S. policy keep open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other countries and world opinion in a settlement, and reduce our commitment to the present leadership of GVN. In
addition to recommended specific actions; Gailbraith suggests the U.S should resist all steps to commit American troops to combat action and dissociate itself from programs which are directed at the villagers, such as the resettlement programs. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached)
460
63.
The JCS comment on Ambassador Galbraith's Memorandum to President Kennedy. The JCS cite the Kennedy letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem as a public affirmation of the intention of the U.S. Government to support President Diem to whatever extent necessary to eliminate the VC threat. In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the present U.S. policy toward SVN as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April 1962
464
64.
ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith!s Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department. In a penciled note "Secretary of Defense has talked to Ambassador Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date that none would be sent." ISA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 14 April 1962
466
65.
The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease-fire in Laos for action in two major areas: (1) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. back-up of that portion of northern Laos west of the Mekong River; and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U.S. forces. Kennedy indicates that he contemplates keeping U.S. forces in Thailand during the period of the negotiations by the three Princes and the early days of the government of national union. NSAM 157, 29 May 1962
467
66.
In an evaluation of the first three months of systematic counter-insurgency, Hilsman of State's INR reports some progress and reason for modest optimism although acknowledging the great amount yet to be done. State Department INR Research Memorandum RFE-27, 18 June 1962.
469
67.
The President approves assignments of responsibilities in the development of U.S. and indigenous police, paramilitary, and military resources to various agences as recommended by the Special Group on Counter Insurgency . Deficiencies revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 include: country
internal defense plans, improvement of personnel programs of agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orientation of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency personnel, support of covert paramilitary operations, increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities, improvement of indigenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency. NSAM 162, 19 June 1962
481
68.
The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency . NSAM 182, 24 August 1962
485
69.
In a year-end summary of the Vietnamese situation and prognosis, Hilsman (State INR) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration has been decreased. GVN control of the countryside, the Strategic. Hamlet Program notwithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department INR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 1961
487
1963
70.
A National Intelligence Estimate states that "Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S. involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt." The VC will continue to wage a war of attrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the North. On the basis of the last year's progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible "to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight." NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963
522
71.
The President approves and directs certain actions outlined in the Department of State Memorandum of 17 June 1963, relative to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriorating situation and from the British and the French before initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedy asks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before any action directed against NVN. NSAM 249, 25 June 1963
525
72.
The President is briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos and VN. Specifically, on SVN, discussions cover the possibility
of getting rid of the Nhus (the combined judgment was that it would not be possible), pressure on Diem to take political actions, possible results of a coup, and the replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Ambassador Lodge. Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 4 July 1963
526
73.
A Special National Intelligence Estimate evaluates the political crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seek to conciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S-GVN relations have deteriorated as a function of Diem's distrust of U.S. motives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The Commun ists have thus far not exploited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non-Communist overthrow. A successor regime with continued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the war. SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963
529
74.
In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Nhu from the government, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alternatives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Nhu is not removed we will be prepared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of interim breakdown of the central government mechanism. State Department Message to Saigon 243, State to Lodge, 24 August 1963
536
75.
U.S. policy with respect to a coup is defined in more detail for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. "The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces. Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning. It Lodge is authorized to suspend aid if he thinks it will enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Department Message 272, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August 1963
538
76.
Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach to Diem about removing Nhu before going ahead with the coup. He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk
feels that if accompanied by the threat of a real sanction -- i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. support -- such an approach could be timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals to make their move and might, therefore, offer some promise of getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge , 29 August 1963
539
77.
Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at the State Department on the subject of SVN. The generals' plot having aborted, Rusk asks what in the situation "lead us to think well of a coup." Further, Rusk feels that it is unrealistic now "to start off by saying that Nhu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk's remarks. Hilsman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (1) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese population; (2) the effect on U.S. programs elsewhere in Asia of the current GVN policy against the Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of Nhu; and (4) U.S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reservations about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem. General Krulak Memorandum for the Record, 31 August 1963
540
78.
Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no longer any prospect of a coup, pressure must be applied to Diem to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particular Lodge is authorized to hold up any aid program if he thinks such action will give him useful leverage in dealing with Diem. CAP Message 63516, White House to Lodge, 17 September 1963
545
79.
The President explains to Lodge his urgent need for the McNamara-Taylor assessment of the situation. The visit is not designed to be a reconciliation with Diem, rather he expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of the political crisis. State Department Message 431, The President to Lodge, 18 September 1963
548
80.
Lodge's reply to the White House CAP Message 63516 indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be unproductive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 544, Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 1963
549
81.
President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending McNamara and Taylor to VN: "I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of
the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 1961 were heartening, the serious events in the South since May 1963 have prompted the President to ask McNamara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SVN is of the first importance…" President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September 1963
551
82.
Pending McNamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(1) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Congo (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam. (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement." State Department Message 458, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963
553
83.
The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, while the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup…" The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure, will move Diem to the moderations and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for RVNAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 1965. In conjunction with this program, the U.S. should announce plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963
554
84.
Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup." Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadership" is authorized, however. CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October 1963
574
85.
Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In the
meeting, General Minh states that he must know the U.S. position on a coup. He stresses that a coup is urgently needed to prevent the loss of the war to the VC. The U.S. contact is noncommita1. CAS Saigon Message 1445, Lodge to State, 5 October 1963
575
86.
Washington reaffirms Lodge's guidance that he is not to promote a coup. Neither, however, is he to thwart one. He should try to obtain as much information as possible from the plotters about their plans on which to base an American judgement about their likelihood of success. CIA Message 74228, 6 October 1963
577
87.
The President approves the detailed military recommendations contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no announcement of the implementation of the 1,000-man withdrawal plan be made. NSAM 263, 11 October 1963
578
88.
A Department of State Research Memorandum contends that the statistical indicators on the war in Vietnam reveal "that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." The analysis angers the JCS and Rusk subsequently apologizes to McNamara. Department of State, INR Research Memorandum RFE-90, 22 October 1963
579
89.
With the coup plotting now far advanced and the U.S. clearly committed to the generals' attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington's anxieties about the lack of detailed information on the generals' plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the military will create a government with better potential for carrying on the war, and because it would constitute undue meddling in Vietnamese affairs. Embassy Saigon Message 1964, Lodge to McGeorge Bundy, 25 October 1963
590
90.
While thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indicates that short of thwarting a coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 25 October 1963
592
91.
The White House instructs Lodge to bring General Harkins completely up to date on the coup plotting, and asks that Harkins, Lodge and the CIA Station Chief provide a combined assessment of the prospects of the plotters. Individual comments are to be sent if desired. With these assessments, a decision can be made telling the generals:
(a) we will maintain a hands-off policy, (b) we will positively encourage the coup, or (c) we will discourage it. More detailed military plans should be sought from Minh. CAS Message 79109, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 30 October 1963
593
92.
After complaining about Lodge's failure to keep him informed about the coup planning, General Harkins opposes the proposed coup against Diem. He does not see an alternative leadership with Diem's strength of character, especially not among the generals. The war continues to go well. MACV Message 2028, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 1963
595
93.
General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpretations of a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October. He offers an optimistic appraisal of the trend of the war and sees the political crisis as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness. MACV Message 2033, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 1963
597
94.
Lodge argues forcefully for the coup. "It is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and would make traitors out of us. For practical purposes, therefore, I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." In the event the coup fails, he believes we should do what we can to help evacuate the generals' dependents. Lodge believes the generals are all taking enormous risks for the sake of their country and their good faith is not to be questioned. "Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in Southeast Asia. We also run tremendous risks by doing nothing." General Harkins did not concur in the cable. CAS Saigon Message 2063, 30 October 1963
600
95.
Taking note of the difference of opinion on the advisability of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the White House specifically informs Lodge that he is to discourage the generals from any attempt that in his judgement has a poor prospect of success. Lodge is given full authority for country team actions in the event of a coup; if he has left for Washington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of a coup, U.S. policy will be: (a) to reject appeals for direct intervention from either side; (b) if the contest is, indecisive, U.S. authorities may perform any actions agreed
to by both sides; (c) in the event the coup fails, asylum may be offered to anyone to whom we have an obligation; but (d) once the coup has started, it is in our interests to see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79407, 30 October 1963
