Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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complexity of this task at the national level and am aware that although certain existing agencies are capable of working in this field, it will take some time to implement fully this comprehensive but vitally important recommendation. I merely wish to invite your attention to the urgent need for expediting the full activation and operation of such a National Agency.
Another matter of urgency at the present time is that of effective border and coastal surveillance capabilities for Vietnam. As pointed out in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, both of these capabilities require high level coordination and will not be full implemented until a national agency such as the Internal Security Council is in operation. There are, however, certain portions of the border and coastal surveillance concepts which can be initiated piecemeal. I know you will agree that any action which can reduce the ability of the Viet Cong to make full use of the land or sea frontiers should be taken as soon as possible. Naturally, MAAG stands ready to work with appropriate agencies of the RVNAF to this end.
As you know, a portion of the 20,000 man force increase was devoted to the activation of three separate Infantry Regiments. In recommending these three units, MAAG intended the creation of a badly needed rotational training base so that regiments from those Infantry Divisions which have, of necessity, been committed to hot war operations for extended periods of time could be rotated for badly needed rest, rehabilitation and retraining in anti-guerrilla tactics. As you know, my superiors approved U.S. support of these Regiments, primarily on my strong personal conviction and consequent recommendation that a rotational capability by Regimental size units was absolutely essential to the adequate and timely training of the RVNAF. There was, and still remains, a critical need for such a rotational training plan, especially in the three divisions in the III Corps area. These three new regimens have, in fact been activated and are training towards operational readiness. However, I am informed that it is now proposed to use them in security roles, one per Corps area. If so, I feel this should be reconsidered, Mr. President, in light of the most urgent need to improve the combat effectiveness of the combat divisions now committed to fighting the Viet Cong and especially as the approval of the increase to 170,000 was made contigent on this use of the forces.
I mentioned earlier that U.S. advisors are now authorized to accompany ARVN units on operations down to battalion and separate company level. This is a significant improvement over the former arrangement, when advisors were not authorized to accompany units into operational
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