Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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adamant in his views as to how the campaign against Communist insurgency should be waged, and he will tend to regard US differences with such views or criticism of his inner circle as indications of weakening US confidence in him.
Diem probably still has some lingering suspicion of the extent of US confidence in and support of his leadership, resulting from the abortive coup attempt of November 1960 and urgent and persistent representations made during that year for liberal political reforms. In the event of another coup effort against Diem, he would probably expect quick and strong US public support and would feel that he did not have US confidence if such support were not forthcoming.
Diem will also continue to press the US for a strong anti-Communist posture in the Far East, particularly as it pertains to US policy toward Laos, Nationalist China, and the issue of Chinese Communist representation in the UN. If he concludes that the US is weakening its anti-Communist posture in the Far last, he will almost certainly make strong protests and become increasingly assertive and stubborn in his relations with the US. However, in the absence of any acceptable alternative to US support and assistance to Vietnam, he is likely to avoid jeopardizing seriously basic US-South Vietnamese ties. Indeed, he would probably seek to establish closer ties with the US by such means as a mutual defense treaty and possibly the stationing of US forces in South Vietnam if the Communist threat to the area increased substantially, as would be manifested, for example, in a Communist takeover of Laos or in the achievement of nuclear capability by Communist China.
In the event of the failure of the international conference at Geneva to reach an effective and satisfactory settlement on Laos or a resumption of all out military operations by the rebel forces in Laos, Diem would be greatly tempted to increase substantially his covert forces in southern Laos and, in cooperation with Lao government forces, attempt to prevent complete Communist control of that area. Diem would probably seek US and Thai participation in a concerted armed effort in southern Laos as well as assurances that the US would defend South Vietnam in case such action precipitated open DRV aggression.
In South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations, the best that probably can be expected from what now appears to be a temporary and ephemeral situation of mutual restraint by Diem and Sihanouk is the resolution of one or more outstanding problem. Although this could probably lessen the chances of recurring crises and possibly strengthen the current political "cease-fire," there is little prospect that cordial relations will develop so long as the present leaders of the two countries remain in power. Moreover, if Sihanouk were to become too accommodating to Communist pressure, particularly in the event the Communists gained a predominant position in Laos, Diem may be unable to resist the temptation
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