Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.
CM-390-61
18 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR
- SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Operations in South Vietnam
1. You will recall that I recently had occasion to look into allegations that the United States is overtraining the Vietnamese Army for a Korea-type war with little or nothing being done to meet the terrorist problem in Vietnam. My inquiries have highlighted the following main points:
- a. The success of the counter-terrorist police organization in Malaya has had considerable impact.
- b. The concept of using local police force to combat local insurgency is politically and diplomatically attractive.
2. I fully agree that we should make maximum use of these aspects of the British counterinsurgency experience in Malaya which are pertinent to the situation in Vietnam. You will recognize, however, that there are major differences between the situations in Malaya and South Vietnam:
- a. Malayan borders were far more controllable in that Thailand cooperated in refusing the Communists an operational safe haven.
- b. The racial characteristics of the Chinese insurgents in Malaya made identification and segregation a relatively simple matter as compared to the situation in Vietnam where the Viet Cong cannot be distinguished from the loyal citizen.
- c. The scarcity of food in Malaya versus the relative plenty in South Vietnam made the denial of food to the Communist guerrillas a far more important and readily usable weapon in Malaya.
