Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/358

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


26 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HADYN WILLIAMS

SUBJECT: The Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Introduction of
U.S. Combat and Logistic Forces into Viet Nam


You have requested that I submit an opinion on the legal question of the compatibility with the Geneva Accords of the actions proposed in Saigon's telegram 537 to the Department of State. The pressure or time forces this opinion to be a preliminary one. A full statement of my reasoning will follow as soon as it can be prepared.

My conclusion is that the actions proposed in the above mentioned telegram would constitute violations of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam of July 20, 1954. That conclusion is not affected by the reasons, ostensible or real, for the actions.

Article 16 prohibits "the introduction into Viet Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel.". The article does permit, however, under strict conditions, "the rotation of units and groups of personnel". Since there were 170,000 foreign troops in Viet Nam at the time of the 1954 Agreement, it can be argued that the United States could introduce up to 170,000 combat troops without causing a violation o chat Agreement That argument would of necessity be based upon the supposed rationale of a decision of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in View Nan, dated April 19, 1960, in which an increase in the MAAG was approved. The Commission gave no reasons for its ruling, and it is far from clear that it would extend its scope to cover combat troops. It is difficult to contend that where troops are introduced to replace other troops which departed five to seven years previously there is a "rotation" of units. Reliance upon the "rotation" defense in the present circumstances wound run rave risks or an adverse ICC decision.



TOP SECRET

329