Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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DATE: 21 NOV 61 |
FROM: NEW DELHI 9941 |
TO: DIRECTOR |
RECD: NOV 21 2137Z 61 |
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE |
IN 25879 |
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
POLICY IN VIETNAM
FROM JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
1. Here is my full analysis of our problem and course in South Vietnam. From my stay there, talks at CINCPAC and Bangkok, previous reading of the traffic and experience of the region I feel reasonably sure of my ground. You will be aware of the intense theological disputes which rage over such issues as the political position of Diem, the scope of external support to the insurrection and others. Where a solution of these is not relevant to a practical course of action I have not entered the debate. I have also endeavored to work from the circumstances of action rather than the more customary procedure which is to move from the preferred course of action back to the circumstances. Where my bias intrudes, as in the case of troop commitment, I have made it clear.
2. The Viet Cong insurrection is still growing in effect. The outbreak on the northern highlands is matched by a potentially even more damaging impact on the economy and especially on the movement of rice to Saigon.
3. In the absence of knowledge of the admixture of terror and economic and social evangelism we had best assume that it is employing both. We must not forever be guided by those who misunderstand the dynamics of revolution and imagine that because the Communists do not appeal to us they are abhorrent to everyone.
4. In our enthusiasm to prove outside intervention before world opinion we have unquestionably exaggerated the role of material assistance especially
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