Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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IN 25879
14. Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr, both heavily identified with this pressure for reform should remain to press their case. Though acting loyally, Nolting is not happy about the effect of pressure on Diem. He believes rather that we should lend him our prestige and power while working more gradually for reform. This policy by my analysis would merely confirm Diem in his inadequacy a risk which Nolting concedes. If our prestige would have provided the security for reform we would have had results long before now.
15. It follows from my reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem. Korea represents the only model that holds out any promise whatever for us. Without doubt Diem was a significant figure in his day. But he has run his course. He cannot be rehabilitated. Incidentally this view is held independently by the senior political counsellor of our embassy, the man who has been longest in Vietnam.
16. In my view, and this is necessarily speculative, dropping Diem will neither be difficult nor unduly dangerous. The Viet Cong are in position to cause trouble widely over the country. That is far from meaning that they are able with their small number to take over and control the country. The Army is ineffective is thought to be non-Communist. The rumors of coups are endemic. Nolting while not in favor has said that a nod from the United States would be influential. At the earliest movement that it becomes evident that Diem will not and cannot implement in any real
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