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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Shaplen, Robert; The Lost Revolution. | ||
| There was a strong possibility in 1945 and 1946 that French and American policy could have "Titofied" Ho Chi Minh, and that Vietnam—albeit under left-wing leadership—might have been a bulwark against Communist Chinese expansion. But the possibility of Vietnam's now becoming a Yugoslavia is remote. | C-14 | |
| Zinn, Howard; Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal. | ||
| A Communist government in Vietnam is the best avenue for improving the lot of the Vietnamese; Ho Chi Minh's dictatorship would be preferable to any elitist dictatorship in South Vietnam. If the U.S. wants to contain China, the U.S. should recognize that Ho Chi Minh would strive to maintain his independence, and thus would accomplish what our military force cannot. | C-18 | |
| Bator, Victor; Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy. | ||
| 1954: China is most important problem facing Vietnam. Double-satellite relationship affords the DRV potential independence. Diem's fanaticism obtruded. | C-20 | |
| Sacks, Milton; "Marxism in Southeast Asia." | ||
| 1946–1949: Ho attempted to preserve neutrality, although this conflicted with his desire for international support and recognition for DRV. | C-21 | |
| Buttinger, Joseph; Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. | ||
| 1946–1947: Ho realized that he could not rally Vietnamese to his struggle for independence with the banner of communism. Hence, the facade of democracy to lend righteousness to the forceful communist campaign to align the people with the Viet Minh and the DRV. | C-23 | |
| Kennedy, John F., quoted in Schlesinger, Arthur M., ed., A Thousand Days. | ||
| 1951: U.S. has joined France in a desperate attempt to preserve empire. U.S. must not rely on arms alone to halt southward thrust of communism, but must harness nationalism. | C-24 | |
| Schlesinger, Arthur M.; The Bitter Heritage. | ||
| The most effective bulwark against an aggressive communist state may well be national communism. A rational U.S. policy aimed at containing China could have recognized connnunist Vietnam in 1954, vice backing a shaky Saigon regime led by right-wing mandarins or generals. | C-25 | |
| Fall, Bernard B.; Viet-Nam Witness. | ||
| The Vietnamese Communists had to conduct their revolution without aid from abroad, even from French Communists. | C-26 | |
C-9
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