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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Eden, Anthony, Earl of Avon; Toward Peace in Indochina. | ||
| The Ho–Peking relationship is not a close parallel to the Tito–Moscow one. Yet Ho has much to gain from neutrality, and much at risk in failing to maintain its Moscow links, or to open a way to American withdrawal. | C-27 | |
| Fulbright, Senator J. William; The Arrogance of Power. | ||
| Ho Chi Minh is the only truly national leader of the Vietnamese; he is also a communist. Vietnamese communism is perhaps the only potential bulwark against Chinese domination. Hence, the U.S. should try to come to terms. | C-28 | |
| Reischauer, Edwin O.; "What Choices Do We Have In Vietnam?" | ||
| The U.S. could have taken a stand against colonialism in 1945, refused to support France in 1950, backed the Geneva settlement in 1954, and declined to increase its military commitment in 1961. Four Presidents rejected the alternative of furthering Ho Chi Minh's cause, but had any done so, the outcome would have been a highly nationalist Vietnam fiercely independent of China. Moreover, Ho's cordial World War II relations with the U.S. indicated a potential for a Tito-like U.S.–Vietnam relationship of no more baleful consequences for Southeast Asia than the present war-torn states. But a nationalist Vietnam would be far preferable, from the U.S. viewpoint, to status quo. | C-29 | |
C-10
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