thing. He points out that the latter is evidently untrue. This may certainly be granted in general; but how does it apply to the particular thing we are examining, viz., concrete individual experience? Strictly speaking, there is only one fact about such an experience in its actuality, which fact may be stated in the proposition 'It exists.' The 'it' of this proposition is the totum objectivum, or presented whole, of individual experience. Its actual nature is only realized fully by the particular perceiving subject. In actual perception, before reflection follows, it is perceived as an indivisible unity. It is often called the 'presentational continuum,' but it is more correct to call it the 'presentational unity.' All other propositions asserting facts (so-called) about experience, are simply attempts to express as adequately as possible in conceptual form the nature of private experience. They are inadequate, for the proposition expressing the sole and particular fact of the existence of the perceived object in its peculiar intimacy and uniqueness realizable only by the percipient, is replaced by a number of propositions, expressing our attempts to deal, by general characterizations, with something which is essentially particular. The attempts furnish us, for the most part, with a sufficient approximation, but in dealing with ultimate questions, it is of the first importance to remember that of necessity they are but approximations.
It is evident, then, that the results of analysis by the scientific method cannot be fully adequate. This does not detract from the value of the former in practice, so far as it goes, for it is the most adequate conceptual method of dealing with experience. We could have no better conceptual way of representing what is called the 'continuity' of experience than by mathematical continuity. But this representation must not be regarded as a final complete solution, for the reasons we have given. It is necessary and sufficient for purposes of calculation, and for the establishment of the validity of certain physical conceptions, but the final solution of the difficulties which have been raised, lies in realizing that the so-called 'continuity' of experience is actually its unity, being, as it is, the experience of one subject.
What exactly is meant by 'one' thing? For example, we talk
