Page:Philosophical Review Volume 27.djvu/260

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248
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XXVII.

of a chair or a table as being one object; but the physicist regards the chair or the table as made up of a number of other single objects, viz., molecules. The molecules again, are made up of atoms, and so on. It appears that there are two distinct meanings to be attached to the word 'one' when applied to things. The first is subjective or ideological, the second objective and absolute.[1] It is in the former sense that a chair or a table is one object. In other words, we speak of a thing as being one, when it functions as one in relation to our purposes, or to the purposes of other subjects of experience. On the other hand, we can only regard a thing as being one in the absolute sense, when it is a true individual. Where do we find such individuals? Evidently physics does not deal with them. Its molecules and atoms are not unique. Subjects and their experiences are the only true individuals. The self may be considered an absolute unit, for it is unique and indivisible. For this reason alone, pluralism, being expressed in terms of selves, would have an advantage over any description of existence in terms of sense-data, for the latter are, as we have seen, purely artificial units. Finally, it should be pointed out that the consideration of the meaning to be attached to the concept of 'one thing' is in no way connected with the meaning of the number 'one.'

VII. Causality.—Among the chief categories which are commonly regarded as applicable to experience, is the category of causality. This category has been a source of difficulty and confusion owing to the unfortunate vagueness and ambiguity with which the term 'causality' is frequently used, especially in its scientific application. Analysis by the new scientific method has done much to clear up this confusion.[2] As a result of this analysis, it is pointed out that with regard to the objective side of experience, we can only say that the sequences observed in it are characterized by sufficient similarity to admit of more or less adequate description in general terms. Hence we can

  1. We might, perhaps, distinguish a third use of the phrase 'one thing.' viz., as applied to a body which moves as a unit. (See Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 53).
  2. B. Russell, op. cit., Lect. VIII.