In the existence of the self, then, the principles of permanence and change are reconciled ; therefore the self is a concrete actuality corresponding to the concept of substance. A distinction is sometimes made between substances and Substance. The latter is regarded as some unity which is the ground of all existence. With the questions as to whether such a unity exists, and if so, what is its exact nature, we are not here concerned; but enough has been said to indicate that we can only form a satisfactory idea of such an all-pervading substance, by considering it to possess all the general characteristics of a self or subject of experience. Keeping, however, to the selves which we know to exist, and which we have identified with substances, what meaning ought we to attach to the term 'attribute' as applied to such individuals? In the first place, the term should be strictly limited. In particular, the fact that A stands in a certain relation to B must not be held to constitute an attribute of A. Propositions assigning [atrributes to an individual are of the subject-predicate form. For our purposes, such propositions may be regarded as falling into two main types. These types may be illustrated by the two propositions: 'He is just,' and 'He is French.' The first makes a statement about the nature of the individual to whom it refers. The second, as such, asserts nothing directly about the nature of the individual, but is rather a specification of certain relations in which he stands. It should be noted, however, that this proposition may be held to imply a number of other propositions of the first type, namely, those assigning to the individual the characteristics he shares in common with all Frenchmen.
The term 'attribute' might well be limited to the predicate of propositions of the first type. A brief consideration suffices to show that such propositions invariably imply something about the mode of activity of the individual concerned. For example 'He is just' really means 'He acts justly.' We base our judgments about the individual on observations of his actions. Thus the attributes of the individual are the ways in which he acts. The fundamental proposition about an individual A is 'A exists,' which is equivalent to 'A acts.' A is a unique particular who
