cannot be further specified symbolically. What we call his attributes consist simply in his mode of activity.
Two categories which seem interwoven particularly closely with the fabric of experience are those of Quality and Relation. Quality and attribute are often used as synonymous terms, but to maintain precise definition we may distinguish between them. Just as we have taken the conception of attribute as appropriately applicable to the individual subject of experience, so may we appropriately apply the concept of quality to the object of that experience. For example, the sense-data presented through different organs differ in quality, e.g., sensations of color differ from those of touch. There are also qualitative differences between sense-data presented through the same organ, e.g., red differs from blue. Differences such as those of intensity, for example, are rather quantitative, implying a relation of more or less between the sensations.
It is correct to say that Quality and Relation are fundamental in the object of experience, if the exact implication of the statement is clearly comprehended. In concrete experience, as such, there is no question of quality or relation. There is simply a given indivisible unity. This unity is particular, and can only be referred to by such words as 'it' or 'this.' Its characteristics cannot be specified conceptually with adequacy. We cannot take a single step in analyzing experience, however, without introducing the concepts of quality and relation. It is this which should be meant by the statement that quality and relation arc fundamental. They are fundamental to the extent that we cannot reflect upon experience at all without introducing them; but into the actual experience as such, they do not enter. This is evident when we remember that quality and relation are general conceptions, whereas experience is essentially particular. All we can say is that when attempting to represent experience conceptually (so far as it can be thus represented), by hypothetically considering it to exhibit certain general characteristics,[1] we find that two of the most indispensable of such characteristics are quality and relation.
- ↑ These are hypothetical in so far as we consider them to be absolutely identical elements in every individual experience.
