the Treatise logically follows. The most probable reasons for these omissions in the later work are the same as those given for the omissions concerning material substance and the existence of an external world.
The doctrine of immortality is practically the same in both works. It is not proved. According to the Inquiry, it cannot be proved;[1] and according to the Treatise, it cannot be proved by metaphysical arguments, but as to whether it can or cannot be proved by "moral arguments and those deriv'd from the analogy of nature," Hume does not explicitly say, although his arguments point to a negative conclusion.[2] In brief, the difference between the two works on the question of immortality is this: The speculative principles unfavorable to this belief are more prominent in the Treatise than in the Inquiry; while the direct arguments unfavorable to this belief are more prominent in the Inquiry than in the Treatise. Not much significance is attached to this change, which is of but minor importance. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to know, if the cautious and somewhat ambiguous treatment of the subject of immortality in the Treatise was due, at least to some extent, to Hume's desire of obtaining for his philosophical system the good opinion of "Dr. Butler"[3]; or if the straightforward and decisive treatment of this question in the Inquiry, and in the essay on immortality, was due to a firmer conviction on the part of Hume, as he grew older, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is incapable of proof. But be this as it may, we have here and in the discussion on necessary connection, perhaps the only instances where there are any traces of development in the later work.
9. Hume's Position. We come lastly to the question, what is Hume's real position? Here there are many differences of opinion, and probably there always will be. For the skeptic and the positivist, the idealist and the materialist may each and all find their favorite views supported by Hume. But whatever his true position may be, I think we may confidently affirm that the standpoint of the two works is logically and practically the
