same. The only question of importance on which there can properly be any discusson, or difference of opinion, in this connection, is Hume's admission in the Appendix concerning the contradiction in his fundamental principles.[1] Did this admission have much influence upon him in preparing the Inquiry? I cannot but think that it had comparatively little, for the contradictory presuppositions are still assumed there as unhesitatingly as they had been in the Treatise. I think that Grimm[2] is inclined to attach too much importance to this admission. In confirmation of the view that has been expressed, we have Hume's own statement: "The philosophical principles are the same in both." Although he repudiated the former work, he did not abandon or modify any of its fundamental principles.[3] He regretted, it is true, his haste in publishing it. But this had reference only to the form, not to the matter. That the position of the Inquiry appears to be more positive than is that of the Treatise, seems to be owing to these two circumstances: (1) the omission of so much destructive matter; and (2) the less dogmatic tone that there prevails. Any differences that exist do not seem to be due to any retractions or modifications of view on the part of Hume in the later work.
If Hume is to be placed in some category,—a procedure which he himself would probably have objected to,—I should say he is a skeptic. And yet this statement will perhaps require limitation. The Treatise is undoubtedly skeptical. And the Inquiry is also skeptical, if read in connection with the Treatise, and in the light of the Treatise. But the Inquiry, if read alone, and taken as the proper representative of Hume's philosophy of human nature, should perhaps rather be called agnostic or positivistic. From the Inquiry alone, however, Hume's science of man and his significance for the history of philosophy are quite incomprehensible. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kant, who was evidently unacquainted with the earlier work, was entirely mistaken in regard to Hume's true position on certain fundamental epistemological questions.
