lated to promote the common good, are called ’naturally good.' Again, the common good being the end, "such actions as take the shortest way to this effect … are naturally called 'right,' because of their natural resemblance to a right line (sic), which is the shortest that can be drawn between any two given points, … but the rule itself is called 'right,' as pointing out the shortest way to the end."[1]
All this is characteristic and important, making allowance for the quaint use of language. The comparison of humanity to an organism is one to which the author constantly recurs.[2] That there is no 'categorical imperative' for Cumberland, is clear. The Laws of Nature themselves have, and need, a 'reason for being.' Conduct in accordance with them conduces to the common weal. It is with reference to this end, that even they are 'right.'
The Introduction closes with a confession on the part of the author that his work is not altogether literary in style or method. The passage is itself, perhaps, calculated to emphasize this statement: "Its face is not painted with the florid colors of Rhetoric, nor are its eyes sparkling and sportive, the signs of a light wit; it wholly applies itself, as it were, with the composure and sedateness of an old man, to the study of natural knowledge, to gravity of manners, and to the cultivating of severer learning."[3]
We shall now neglect the author's own order of exposition almost entirely, and endeavor to see the system as a whole, both in its strength and its weakness. It might seem as if we were logically bound to begin with a consideration of the Nature of Things, as Cumberland himself professes to do.[4] A very casual examination of the work under consideration, however, would be sufficient to show that the titles of the chapters give but a very indefinite idea of the nature of their contents. What Cumberland actually does, at the beginning of his treatise, is to explain at considerable length and with great care his notion of Laws of Nature. It is probable, however, that
