Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/298

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282
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. IV.

he was induced to do this largely for controversial reasons; and we are first of all concerned with the constructive part of the work, although it is quite impossible to separate this entirely from the controversial part. It must always be remembered,—the title of the treatise to the contrary notwithstanding,—that the jural aspect of the system is not its most essential feature. Cumberland held the views that he did regarding Natural Laws in common with a great many of his contemporaries,—perhaps the majority of those representing the conservative tendency.[1] His originality consisted in his attempt to discover an underlying principle from which all the special moral 'laws' or 'practical propositions' could be deduced.

It does not seem best, then, to begin, as Cumberland actually did, with an examination of the concept of Natural Law. Nor is one tempted to begin with the Nature of Things, ostensibly the first topic treated. Cumberland uses that expression throughout the treatise as if its meaning were perfectly clear and understood by everybody. His utterances on the subject, however, have all the confusion to which an author is liable whose interests are wholly practical, and who yet is obliged to speak in terms of an implicit metaphysic. At present we need notice only two passages. "The Nature of Things does not only signify this lower world, whereof we are a part, but its Creator and Supreme Governor, God.… It is certain that only true propositions, whether speculative or practical, are imprinted upon our minds by the Nature of Things, because a natural action points out that only which exists, and is never the cause of any falsehood, which proceeds wholly from a voluntary rashness, joining or separating notions which Nature has not joined or separated."[2] Again, "We cannot doubt of the nature of created beings, but that both things external, exciting thoughts in us, and our mind comparing these thoughts, are the causes of Necessary Truths."[3] The vagueness and inconsequence of these remarks speak for themselves,

  1. Even Locke was strongly influenced by the current view.
  2. See p. 191.
  3. See p. 192.