of the Good in general? We have seen that he speaks, now in terms of 'preservation' and 'perfection,' now in terms of 'happiness.' In one passage, while maintaining the somewhat trite thesis that virtue is its own reward,' he says: "I care not in this argument to distinguish between the health of mind and the consciousness or enjoyment thereof by reflection, since nature has so intimately united these two, that the free exercise of the virtues and the perception or inward sense thereof are inseparable."[1] A statement like this must put us on our guard against expecting too definite an answer to the question which we are considering. 'Happiness' always attends 'perfection'; 'perfection' is necessary in order that we may attain 'happiness.' Practically, then, it makes little difference which we say,—and Cumberland's aim was preëminently a practical one, as we have seen. I do not believe that it is possible dogmatically to decide on either interpretation. We should be forcing a distinction, important for us, upon an author who regarded it with frank indifference. Indeed, it would be much truer to say that both happiness and perfection, in our understanding of the words, are included in our author's conception of the Good.
It should be noticed, however, that Cumberland's actual treatment of 'happiness' is a good deal clearer than his treatment of 'perfection'; and there is always the lurking possibility that the latter may be regarded as of such importance, because it is a necessary means to the former. The general impression which the system gives one certainly is that, on the whole, it is hedonistic. At the same time, it would be sheer misrepresentation to hold that it is consistently so. It is much better to let the two principles, which we now regard as logically distinct, stand side by side, recognizing, however, that greater emphasis is laid upon 'happiness' than upon 'perfection.' This comparatively vague treatment of 'perfection' has led Professor Sidgwick to hold that Cumberland "does not even define perfection so as strictly to exclude from it the notion of
- ↑ See p. 265.
