moral perfection, or virtue, and save his explanation of morality from an obvious logical circle."[1] I am inclined to think that, for once, Professor Sidgwick is wrong in his interpretation. As Dr. Spaulding has shown,[2] the 'perfection' referred to is a 'perfection of mind and body,'[3] which is explained as the 'development of their powers.'[4] This will be plain if we keep in mind what Cumberland says regarding 'naturally' good things. These are defined as (1) those which adorn and cheer the mind, and (2) those which preserve and increase the powers of the body.[5]
We shall now have to notice the distinction (just referred to) which Cumberland makes between what is 'naturally' and what is 'morally' good. This has been ignored hitherto, because it is likely to lead to confusion. What things 'naturally' good are, we have just seen. On the other hand, "only voluntary actions conformable to some law, especially that of Nature," are 'morally' good. It is quite misleading, when Cumberland insists that 'natural' good is more extensive than 'moral' good. It is not a matter of more or less, but of what we may call, for convenience, the 'substantive' and the 'adjective' use of the word 'good.' Certain things, once for all, do, according to the eternal nature of things, conduce to man's preservation, perfection, and happiness. These are 'naturally' good, or, as we now prefer to say, they constitute the Good. On the other hand, those 'voluntary actions' which conduce to the Good, and so fulfil the Laws of Nature, are called 'morally' good. This is a particularly unfortunate use of language, for it looks at first as if Ethics had to do only with the 'morally' good. This is so far from being true that 'natural' good is the ultimate, not that which is 'morally' good; otherwise Cumberland would be involved in a manifest circle at the very outset. But while Ethics must needs begin with a consideration of 'natural good,'—'the Good,' as we shall call it,—it is not equally concerned with all that would ideally go to consti-
