tute the Good. Cumberland himself, in the first chapter of the treatise,[1] calls our attention to the usefulness of the Stoics' distinction between things in our power and things out of our power. Now Ethics, from the nature of the case, must be practically limited in its scope to a consideration of things in our power. At the same time, to limit the Good to things in our power would be obviously stultifying, whether we accept preservation, perfection, or happiness (in our sense of the word) as the criterion. The only type of Ethics which can do that is the 'duty Ethics,' the Ethics of the 'good will'; and, however heterogeneous the elements may be that enter into Cumberland's system, he surely is not affiliated to the school referred to.
So far we have been considering the Good quite in general. As a matter of fact, of course, when the Laws of Nature are under consideration, Cumberland has in mind, not the good of any individual or class merely, but the good of all,—or rather, to be more exact, the good of the greatest number. Indeed, that this good of the whole is greater than the (hypothetical) good of the isolated part, and therefore the 'greatest end' of human action, Cumberland practically puts among self-evident truths.[2] But, as he says, "the good of the collective body is no other than the greatest which accrues to all, or to the major part of the whole."[3] Although he speaks of society as an organic whole, particularly when he is concerned to show that the good of each ultimately coincides with the good of all others, he never loses sight of the claims of the individual, as some modern theorists, standing on much the same ground, are rather inclined to do.
It is to be remembered that the 'greatest end' is nothing less than the 'joint felicity of all rationals,' so that the happiness or glory of God is included, as well as the happiness of all men. If there be question as to the 'parts' of the 'greatest end,' and their 'order,' we are told: "that part of the end will be superior which is grateful to the nature of the more perfect being. So that the glory of God is chief, then follows the
