Chapter vi, "Of Those Things contained in the General Law of Nature," is very short, and even so contains a good deal that has been treated before. This is rather disappointing, for it is just here that we should naturally look for the most important part of the 'deduction.' Two questions are proposed by the author: (1) What things are comprehended in the common good? and (2) What actions tend to promote it? The answer to the first question contains nothing new or to the present purpose. As regards actions tending to promote the common good, Cumberland divides them into classes, each corresponding to the particular 'faculty' of the mind supposed to be principally involved. Hence we have (1) acts of the Understanding, (2) acts of the Will and Affections, or acts of the body determined by the Will. Under the former head Cumberland treats of Prudence, which he divides into (a) Constancy, and (b) Moderation. Constancy, again, may manifest itself either as Fortitude or as Patience; while Moderation implies Integrity and Diligence, or Industry.
Passing to 'acts of the Will' enjoined by the Law of Nature, these are found to be all included in 'the most extensive and operative benevolence.' The author says: "It belongs to the same benevolence to endeavor that nothing be done contrary to the common good, and to correct and amend it if there has; hence Equity [or Justice] is an essential branch of this virtue."[1] This Universal Benevolence also includes Innocence, Gentleness, Repentance, Restitution, and Self-denial; and, further, Candor, Fidelity, and Gratitude. "In these few heads," says Cumberland, "are contained the primary special Laws of Na- ture and the fundamental principles of all virtues and all societies."
In this connection Cumberland asserts that some actions may be regarded as morally 'indifferent,' but the term is misleading. Those actions without which it is impossible to obtain the end proposed are 'necessary'; those to which there are others equivalent, i.e., equally calculated to conduce to the common weal, are termed 'indifferent.' Every action, then,
- ↑ See p. 309.
