may very well have a moral character; and yet it may be no more efficacious in promoting the 'greatest end' than certain other actions. Accordingly it may, in this sense only, be termed 'indifferent.' These cases, we are told, leave room for the greatest individual freedom; also for positive laws contracting such liberty within narrower bounds.
It will be seen that, however original and important may have been Cumberland's idea that the particular laws of moral action, or Laws of Nature, could be deduced from one principle, viz., that requiring of all moral agents conduct that should conduce to the common good; his 'deduction' of these particular Laws thus far contains little or nothing calling for remark, unless it be the naïve application of a more than usually crude 'faculty psychology,' where he distinguishes between acts of the understanding and those of the will and affections. This, however, is not relevant to the present discussion.
The two remaining chapters, vii, "Of the Original of Dominion and the Moral Virtues," and viii, "Of the Moral Virtues in Particular," treat incidentally of a great variety of topics, but are principally concerned with the Laws of Nature which have to do with the distribution and tenure of property. It does not seem best to follow the author's order of exposition, particularly as a matter touched upon in the earlier part of the book should be treated in connection with this subject.
It will be remembered that Hobbes had maintained, though not in so many words, that 'self-preservation is the first law of nature'; and also, as regards property, that in a state of nature each had a 'right' to all,—which, of course, means only that each had a 'right' to all that he could get and keep.[1] Otherwise stated, self-preservation (or the conscious seeking of one's own happiness) was regarded not only as a 'right,' but as the only original spring of action, while brute force was regarded as the only criterion. Possession was ten-tenths of the law; though, of course, this possession on the part of the strongest could be only of the most temporary character, owing to the (approximate) 'original equality' of men.
- ↑ As a matter of fact, this hypothetical 'right to all things' extended not only to the material good things of life, but to everything whatever.
