mathematics, has to postulate certain definite and comparatively simple conditions, such as lines without breadth or thickness and forming with absolute precision given curves; so the abstract moralist, in order to reach his conclusions, might postulate beings endowed with only those attributes essential for his purpose, and placed in circumstances known to him with exactitude. He might commence with two beings, both of them sentient, both intelligent, standing in all essential respects on a footing of equality, and foreknowing with certainty all the consequences of all their acts. In so simple a case, the answer to some of the foregoing questions might be more readily perceived. The conditions of the two beings might then be varied in different ways; and the moralist would have to consider how the variations affected the several questions. Then he might bring on the scene a third being, whose happiness depended on the unhappiness of one of the others; and next a whole race of beings, and so on; until, having satisfied himself on some of the more pressing points in abstract ethics, he had a body of principles to be applied to the actual affairs of life. No doubt the abstract inquiry if pushed too far might soon become profitless. Yet, on the other hand, where is the profit in discussing concrete problems, until we have decided to some extent what it is that we want in the concrete, what the principles are to which we believe that conduct must conform in order to be right or wrong?
To illustrate the sphere of concrete ethics, the following may be given as examples of the questions to which answers can be furnished only with the help of this branch of the science. What form of government is most conducive to an equitable distribution of happiness (the principle of equity having, of course, been decided by abstract ethics)? Is homicide in a particular instance justifiable? Ought we to punish people for vagrancy and begging? Is polygyny a better form of marriage than polyandry? Are we in any likely circumstances justified in taking by force the property of others? Is there a strong probability that moral maxims which are generally acknowledged by the community are essential to social welfare ?
