In abstract ethics our results may be, perhaps, as definite and exact as the results of pure mathematics, that is, so far as our mental capacity enables us to think out—or, perhaps, to feel out—the ethical problems we set ourselves. But although I believe that the recognition of the distinct spheres of abstract and concrete ethics might tend considerably to lessen confusion, I am not so sanguine as to expect that it would lead, in the near future, to that fortunate unanimity in our ethical speculations which prevails in the domain of mathematics. A further suggestion may, therefore, be thrown out to help to explain the confusion of ethical science: namely, that many ethical problems, some of which are of really pressing importance, are altogether beyond the powers of the average human mind as at present constituted. The comparative want of uniformity in our abstract ethical judgments may, perhaps, be used as an argument against the objective reality of any ethical principles at all. May we not, however, see the explanation of our disagreements, not in the unreality of the truths we seek for, but in the supposition that, as regards its power of grasping principles of this particular order, the human mind is as yet in its infancy? If we suppose, as seems a priori probable, that mathematical capacity, being unconnected with altruism, is in some way connected with capacity for self-preservation, while ethical capacity, which has reference to the well-being of others than the agent, is of little or no advantage to the individual in the struggle for existence, it will hardly surprise us to find that, in the order of their development, our powers of apprehending truths of quantity have taken precedence of our powers of apprehending truths of obligation. This would be merely in keeping with the obvious facts to which Mr. Herbert Spencer refers, when he says that "egoism comes before altruism."
In concrete ethics, as in other human affairs, our results must often be partially guesses. The aim, to a great extent, should be to apply the essence of morality to the various concerns of life in a set of practical rules that leave to the individual as little as possible to decide for himself on the spur of the moment, although, in point of fact, a great deal must always be
