I have referred to what appears to me to be Professor Sidgwick's treatment of the idea of Good, in order that the view which I am about to suggest may be emphasized by its contrast therewith. We may abandon the assumption to which I have referred, in the form in which Professor Sidgwick appears to hold it, and we may abandon the attempt to fill in ab extra the conception of the Good; we need not take it and try whether Pleasure, Virtue, Knowledge, etc., will fit it or not. We may turn to the facts which lead us to suppose that there is a supreme end; and if there are such facts, they ought to show us how to 'fill in' the conception, in other words, give a clue as to the form in which we may represent the End. As a preliminary, however, to a more exact statement of the teleological treatment of Ethics, I proceed to indicate a possible grouping of ethical inquiries, in order to observe their relative importance.
§ 2. The most convenient starting-point for Ethics is the fact of moral judgment. We say of an act that it is 'right,' our 'duty,' 'ought' to be done; or again that it is 'wrong,' 'ought not' to be done. We also recognize that there is a Good for man, which is believed to be realized, at least in part, in the performance of duty. We have, further, certain characteristic emotions that attach to these distinctions. In proportion as man becomes an intelligent being, with the growth of education, civilization, and (in general terms) with the maturing of social life, he manifests these ethical characteristics in ways that tend to become similar. Now Ethics, according to the most general possible statement of its problem, seeks for the meaning and significance of these characteristics of our nature. The inquiries to which this attempt gives rise may be grouped as follows:
(1) The most general questions that may be called the 'Meta- physic of Ethics,' embracing: (a) the meaning and significance of what is called 'moral authority,'—i.e., the feelings of obligation and personal origination and responsibility; (b) the nature of the Good which seems to be realized in the performance of duty, and the possibility of there being a supreme Good.
