(2) The ultimate criterion of morality in conduct: the meaning or 'connotation' of the conception of Right. Using a metaphor derived from formal logic, we may say the general problem here is: What are the 'attributes' of rightness in conduct? With this is connected the perplexing question of the precise objects of moral judgment: To what elements in the complex fact that we call a 'voluntary act' or 'conduct' does the judgment refer?
(3) The proximate criterion of morality: the 'denotation' of Right. The general problem here is: How do we find out what particular actions are right? This is what is known as Applied Ethics; and it corresponds to Professor Sidgwick's definition of a Method of Ethics.
First of all, we must notice the relation of these inquiries to one another. As regards (2) and (3), it is evident that an answer to the former carries with it an answer to the latter. In answering (2) we should arrive at some kind of general principle, and the problem (3) would consist in applying this to particular cases. On the other hand, an answer to (3)—e.g., 'tendency of the act to promote the greatest happiness of all concerned'—does not necessarily carry with it an answer to (2). Hence it is possible to expatiate largely in a quasi- scientific manner in the region of applied Ethics without touching any of the deeper problems.
It is more important, however, to observe the relation of (1) and (2). Here, again, it is evident that an answer to the former carries with it an answer to the latter, since if there is a supreme End or ultimate Good, right conduct must consist in promoting it. But it is also evident that any answer to (2) presupposes at least a partial answer to (1). Indeed, whether (1) and (2) are not identical, depends on the wider or narrower sense in which the word 'conduct' is understood. It may be taken as coextensive with the whole of human conscious activity in the widest sense the whole of rational action in all directions. In this case the Right means the Summum Bonum, the ideal of the whole life of the man, as realized in conation, feeling, and thinking. I might illustrate by refer-
