that action, tho' that action promote my happiness to never so great a degree, yet that agent acquires no merit, i.e., he is not thereby entitled to any favor and esteem." It makes a great difference, to be sure, whether another aims at my favor in general, or only for some particular end which he has in view. "I am under less obligation (caeteris paribus) the more particular his expectations from me are; but under obligation I am."[1]
Gay concludes by noticing a possible "grand objection" to his theory. It is this. The reason or end of action must always be known to the agent; otherwise, it would not actually be his motive. The inquiry, e.g., is not why one should be grateful, but why one is so. As Hutcheson has shown, the majority of mankind approve of virtue immediately, and apparently without regard to their own interest. Must we not, then, after all, assume that author's 'moral sense' and 'public affections'?
The reply given to this supposed question is substantially as follows. The matter of fact here appealed to has already been admitted, and it is perfectly consistent with our theory. "As, in the pursuit of truth, we don't always trace every proposition whose truth we are examining to a first principle or axiom, but acquiesce as soon as we perceive it deducible from some known or presumed truth, so in our conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate end of our actions, happiness; but rest contented as soon as we perceive any action subservient to a known or presumed means of happiness.… And these RESTING PLACES[2] are so often used as principles, that, at last, letting that slip out of our minds which first inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them not, as they really are, the substitutes of principles, but principles themselves." Hence people have imagined 'innate ideas,' 'instincts,' and the like; and the author adds: "I cannot but wonder why the pecuniary sense, a sense of power and party, etc., were not mentioned, as well as the moral,—that of honor, order, and some others."[3]
