More exactly, the true explanation is this. "We first perceive or imagine some real good, i.e., fitness to promote our happiness, in those things which we love and approve of." Hence we annex pleasure to the idea of the same, with the result that the idea and the attendant pleasure become indissolubly associated. Gay's first example is the one which has since become so well known in this connection, i.e., the love of money. It is matter of experience that money, first desired merely for what it will procure, sometimes itself becomes the exclusive object of pursuit. In the same way knowledge, fame, etc., come to be regarded as ends in themselves. Now this principle is quite sufficient, he holds, to explain our disinterested practice of virtue, as well as certain perverted tendencies of human nature.
As regards these latter, Gay treats in particular of envy, emphasizing the fact that we never envy those who are very much above or below us, but rather those who may fairly be regarded as in some sense competitors. The teleology is plain, he thinks; the success of those with whom we either directly or indirectly compete means less chance for ourselves. "This," as he quaintly adds, "may possibly cast some light upon the black designs and envious purposes of the fallen angels. For why might not they have formerly had some competition with their fellows? And why may not such associations be as strong in them as [in] us?"
At the very close of the Dissertation the author barely refers,—though what he says is perfectly clear and to the point,—to another consideration which does much to make his general (hedonistic) position plausible. It is not necessary, he says, that we should form associations like those above described for ourselves. We may very well take them from others, i.e., "annex pleasure or pain to certain things or actions because we see others do it, and acquire principles of action by imitating those whom we admire, or whose esteem we would procure. Hence the son too often inherits both the vices and the party of his father, as well as his estate." In this way we can account for national virtues and vices, disposi-