what objects will contribute to that end, and of assigning to various objects the due and just proportion which is essential to the harmonious functioning of all the parts under the law of the whole. Thus; while not constituting the matter of happiness, it gives the form to happiness, the material elements of which, as has been previously noted, are the gratifications of the particular affections.[1] That self-love may be an intelligent guide, it must gain a concrete knowledge of what constitutes true and lasting happiness. For this, experience is indispensable, since such knowledge is not given intuitively, and since self-love, unlike the particular affections which always have a particular perception of their proper objects, does not possess a specific idea of the constituents of self-interest. The place of experience has received little or no emphasis in expositions of Butler's system, although it has an obvious bearing on his intuitionism. In the fifth chapter of the Analogy,[2] Butler discusses the part experience plays in relation to man's temporal interest, and his argument is relevant here in order to show that self-love has no ready-made a priori ideas of concrete actions that lead to happiness. Through knowledge empirically derived, we bring to light in actual consciousness the content of self-interest, and, it may be added, of morality itself, although we are at present concerned only with the former.
The sphere of self-love is prudence, and prudential considerations apply, not only to temporal, but also to ultimate interest. Butler regards this life as a state of probation and discipline, preparatory for the future life. Hence self-love, in guiding man to true temporal happiness, is fulfilling its share of the preparation for ultimate happiness.[3] In the performance of this rational function, it is acting under the law of virtue, and is to be regarded as a moral principle. Taken in itself, without consideration of conscience, self-love imposes its own obligation. If human nature
- ↑ This distinction contains an implicit solution of the vexed question of qualitative differences in pleasures. In the eyes of reason, and from the point of view of happiness as one aspect of the organic end of man, pleasures do differ qualitatively. Their suitability or fitness is not inherent in the nature of the particular pleasures as such, but consists in their harmony with, and tendency to promote, the end of human nature.
- ↑ Part I, Chap. V, §§ 13, 16, pp. 114, 116.
- ↑ Analogy, Part I, Chap. V, § 25, p. 122.
