were composed of no other principles than self-love and the particular affections, it would be the duty of such a being to follow
the superior principle, irrespective of every other consideration.
In human nature as it is, however, action from self-love receives
a higher sanction and obligation, since our moral faculty approves
of prudent actions and disapproves of imprudent ones, as such,
and considered independently of consequences. Thus rational
self-love becomes associated with conscience, or, rather, it is one
aspect of the moral faculty, and prudence becomes a strictly
moral duty and part of the province of virtue.[1] There can, consequently, be no conflict whatever between the obligation imposed
by self-love and that imposed by conscience, for "duty and interest are thus perfectly coincident."[2] The first lesson that self-love
must learn is that it can attain its own end only by working
harmoniously with conscience.
In turning from the discussion of self-love to that of benevolence, one meets with an apparent confusion, in that Butler treats benevolence both as a particular affection and as a rational principle on a level with self-love. To ask which of the two views represents Butler's 'characteristic position' would lead to a misapprehension, since he is conscious of the dualism, although the fact that he is not as explicit as one would like, and does not always keep his two treatments separate, might seemingly justify the opinion that there is a real confusion. To reach an understanding upon this point is of the utmost importance for an evaluation of Butler's system, our final view of which depends to a large extent upon the determination of the position assigned to benevolence in his analysis of human nature. In treating benevolence as a particular affection, Butler's purpose is to demonstrate that self-interest does not contravene the nature of other-regarding conduct; that, on the contrary, the gratification of the social affections (which are included under the class name 'benevolence') is as vital to individual happiness as that of any other propension. In fact, whenever Butler treats benevolence as a particular affection, he is arguing against Hob-
