bes's 'state of nature.' He is endeavoring to exhibit the falsity of Hobbes's "war of every man against every man," by showing that our nature, even on its sensible side, relates us to others, since we have affections within us which rest in the good of others as their object. He is anxious to establish how deeply unnatural is such a state of warfare as that described by Hobbes. The truth of this statement is apparent from the numerous references to Hobbes, which occur frequently in the body of his sermons and in many footnotes wherever benevolence is included in the category of particular propensions.[1]
Now, when benevolence is thus viewed, it must logically be regarded as subservient to self-love, and the raison d'être of it and all particular social affections must find vindication in their ability to contribute to the end of self-love. Butler, therefore, takes pains to show that these 'public affections' yield a clear balance of satisfaction to the agent. It is to be remembered, however, that it is always the particular affection, and never the general principle, of benevolence which he justifies by an appeal to self-love. It is true that in doing this he is sometimes led into unguarded statements, which seem to confuse the above distinction, but, on the other hand, I do not think that such passages are to be discovered in other connections.
In Sermon III, after having expounded his view of human nature as a ’constitutional' whole, and having insisted upon the 'grand supremacy' of conscience, Butler considers what may be said against obeying the law of our nature. The objection raises the question why we should not dismiss regard for others and the restraints which it involves. In answer, Butler maintains that "all this kind of talk goes upon the supposition that our happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct from regards to others," whereas the truth is that our own enjoyment depends largely "upon these regards of one kind or another to our fellow-creatures," and that we can gain no end whatever
- ↑ See Pref. to Sermons, § 29, pp. 21, 22; Sermon I, § 4, note b, pp. 36, 73; Sermon V, § I, note a, pp. 93, 96; Ibid., §§ 15, 16, pp. 106, 107. The whole of Sermon XI, also, which deals with benevolence exclusively as a particular affection, is for the most part in refutation of Hobbes.
