Before leaving Mr. Bigelow's exposition of errors, into which unless upon our guard we might perhaps be led, it may be observed that his report, prepared after a personal inspection of the work, is one of the most judicial documents published upon the subject; and those desirous of forming an impartial estimate would do well to acquaint themselves with it. To indicate the importance attached by Mr. Bigelow to the completion of the work we may cite the passage which follows. He observes that the French, especially people of moderate means, possess for several reasons extraordinary faith in De Lesseps; partly because they know that De Lesseps does not "job" with the securities of the undertaking; partly because of the financial success of the Suez Canal; and partly because the completion of the Panama Canal under De Lesseps's auspices "would rank among the half-dozen largest contributions ever made to the permanent glory of France."
These references to Mr. Bigelow's report may be supplemented by an extract or so from the latest report made to our Government on the subject, the "Special Intelligence Report" of Lieutenant W. W. Kimball, United States Navy, who inspected the works about the same time as Mr. Bigelow, early in 1886.[1] Lieutenant Kimball says: "That with a sufficient expenditure of money, time, brains, energy, and human life, the canal can be finished, is self-evident, but it would be idle for me to attempt to estimate the necessary quantity of all or any of them. Too many of the prime data for calculation are unknown quantities."
If such a statement on the part of Lieutenant Kimball makes us cautious in accepting the present, or at least recent, estimate of the company as to ultimate cost, 1,200,000,000 francs, it may make us equally cautious in accepting the pessimistic, larger estimates which appear from time to time.
As regards the plans Lieutenant Kimball says, "As might be expected of the work of the eminent engineers who have made the plans, the design is almost above criticism."
With reference to the proposed dam at Gamboa, by which the freshets of the Chagres River are to be controlled, a work as to whose impracticability or insufficiency much has been said, the writer observes, "The engineering difficulties are to me not at all patent."
This exhaustive report is not without strictures upon the course of the company in certain cases. Lieutenant Kimball, in particular, is disposed to think, while holding that the plans for the control of the Chagres River are practicable enough, that their execution has been unadvisedly delayed; floods have at certain points carried into the excavation fresh deposits which will require to be re-excavated.[2]
