In concluding these considerations, it may be remarked that it is less than ever safe to try to fix at present the cost of the undertaking. The company is considering the advisability of executing it upon a less extensive and costly scale in certain respects. Possibly, though the company has for the present decided against it, the lock plan may be adopted, and, until such practical questions are finally settled it is impossible to estimate the expense.
Some may still ask, Is a canal or a ship-railway worth building, after all? Even Admiral Ammen intimated doubts as late as 1879, after the decision of the Paris Congress, as to whether the time had come to cut the Isthmus.[1] It may not be hard to satisfy ourselves on this point. In a report submitted to the Navy Department in 1860 by Admiral C. H. Davis, an estimate is given of the tonnage which would have used a canal had one been in existence, as well as of the loss inflicted upon commerce because of its lack.[2] The former estimate is 3,094,070 tons, which agrees pretty well with the estimate of the Paris Congress for the year 1879, if we assume the rate of annual increase from 1866 to 1879 which the Congress adopted. Admiral Davis's estimate of the loss annually experienced by commerce was $49,530,208. These estimates, made over twenty years ago, would be evidently too low for 1887. But even should we assume that in the course of the past twenty years no increase of traffic had occurred, a result sufficiently surprising would be arrived at. The loss to commerce in four years would amount to $200,000,000, about the cost of the Panama Canal according to the estimate of the Paris Congress. This simple calculation shows the importance of the work. Mr. Bigelow, in his report, already quoted, says, with reference to the Panama Canal, "Were all nations to contribute toward its construction in any equitable proportion to the advantages they would derive from it, the stock would be as difficult to obtain as the golden apples of Atalanta."
We have thus far supposed that the tonnage which would pay dues to a canal, as well as the loss which the lack of a canal occasions, has not increased for the past twenty years. It is true that Admiral Davis's computation of this increase would lead us to exaggerated conclusions. According to this estimate, the tonnage which would use a canal would double every ten years. The estimated loss ex-
- ↑ "The American Interoceanic Ship-Canal Question," by Admiral Ammen, p. 66.
- ↑ These computations, as well as an estimate of the supposed rate of tonnage increase, were originally made by Frederick M. Kelley and published in a pamphlet in 1859. They are incorporated by Admiral Davis into his report.
According to this dispatch, Lieutenant Rogers states in his report that the company did as much work during the past year as it had done in all the preceding years—which seems to be an exaggeration. While he doubts somewhat that the present company will be able to complete the undertaking, he thinks the ultimate completion of it is certain, and he considers it better to finish the Panama Canal than to spend money on the Nicaragua project.
