has been brought under this major premise as a particular case of the principle. Professor Pillsbury consequently points out how comparatively insignificant both from the logical and from the psychological point of view the syllogism is as an expression of the nature of the concrete process of reasoning. To bring cases under major premises is to do little to confirm our belief except in so far as one thus emphasizes in a somewhat formal way the tendency of every new or questionable fact to find its place by being brought into conformity with the habits, or better with the principles of action, which have been formulated on the basis of previous experience. Deductive proof appears therefore to be, as Professor Pillsbury says, not so different from induction as is usually supposed, and to be in any case of comparatively minor importance. The business of proof, according to Professor Pillsbury, is to produce belief. Belief in general is not produced by formulating major premises. It is produced by a more complex process whose general nature he sets forth.
Other familiar discussions of the reasoning process, such as one finds in the text-books of recent pragmatists, agree with Professor Pillsbury in assuming that it is of the essence of deduction or of deductive proof to proceed from the general to the particular, and that the significance of deductive proof lies in the fact that one hereby formulates, often somewhat uselessly, the general process by which an adjustment to the environment in cases of initial doubt or difficulty is attained. Apart from these statements more characteristic of pragmatists, a wide-spread tradition, which unfortunately is supported by the older logical textbooks themselves, maintains that it is of the essence of deductive reasoning to bring nothing out of the premises except what was already in them, so that the essence of the deduction is "analysis." From this point of view it is supposed that when you engage in deduction you solemnly draw out of the bag the cat which you have already hidden in it. You declare, for instance, that all the that are are indeed , and solemnly demonstrate that all the white mice must be both white and mice. It is unquestionable that many of the logicians of the past as well as the psychologists of recent times have conspired to give this impression of the deductive process. But whatever the psychology of deduction may be, any fair examination of the work of the exact deductive operations of science, and especially any examination of the work of mathematics, shows that deduction as it exists in real life is simply not this fiction of the older logical text-books. And yet to the psychological analysis of this fiction, with the natural result that such a process is not of very great importance. Professor Pillsbury, as I understand him, devotes himself in his discussion of the place of the syllogism in life.
But anybody who undertakes to deal with the psychology of reason-
