ing ought, I think, to take account of the fact that there is nowadays a new logic, that this new logic is in considerable part the work of men whose attention has been attracted to the nature of the deductive process by a wide experience of mathematical procedure, and that this new logic shows us with regard to the syllogism, for instance, two things, first that the essence of the syllogism does not consist in the fact that a particular case is brought under a general principle; and secondly, that the syllogism is by no means the only form of deductive reasoning. From the point of view of the new logic, the student has upon his hands the problem that Poincaré has so well stated at the outset of his book, "Science and Hypothesis." This is the problem presented by the enormous Fecundity of the Deductive Process. Our own American logician, Charles Peirce, long since called attention to this fecundity. It is a fact of much philosophical importance. What I mean by the fecundity of deduction as a logical fact can be suggested by what Poincaré mentioned, and also by a summary of the matters to which Peirce has frequently called attention. Poincaré states the case thus: From the point of view of the older interpretation of the nature of the syllogism it would seem impossible that a deductive science such as mathematics could do anything but draw out of premises what it had already more or less overtly or secretly put into them. Nothing novel could result. And in fact if the reasoning of mathematics were all of the kind that Professor Pillsbury supposes to be the typical deductive reasoning, mathematical science would consist in a process as stupid and monotonous as the process of taking the major premise. All men are mortal, and then looking up all the names in a directory and solemnly concluding to write opposite to each name the fact that since this person is a man he is mortal. But now as a fact mathematical science consists of nothing of the kind. The situation is actually this: you can write upon a few sheets of paper an accurate statement of a set of principles from which the whole science of the quantities of ordinary algebra can be deduced. That is to say, the principles of the ordinary mathematical analysis are capable of such a brief statement as this. But the consequences of these principles are such that novel results in vast numbers are annually discovered. These results are not stowed away in the premises in any such way as that in which the mortality of this man is stowed away in the assertion of the mortality of all men.
Poincaré, in the passage to which I have referred, suggests his own theory to account for the fecundity of mathematical analysis. His theory may as a logical theory be questioned. But the fecundity to which he attracts attention ought to be a commonplace to any one who has looked into any branch of mathematics with care. Peirce has called attention to this fact, and speaking as a logician has gone further. Following a lead of De Morgan's, Peirce has shown that any proposition
