It is sufficient however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that we can attribute to him nothing superior.”[1] If it is not possible therefore to form any ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the ineffable, i. e. of the first principles of things, how much less can our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,[2] which is even beyond these? Had the Heathens therefore considered as they ought this transcendency of the supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshipped men as Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its dogmas, and the confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily attended.
In the last place, I wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to prove that statues were not considered nor worshipped by any of the intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblances of the Gods, as auxiliaries to the recollection of a divine nature, and the means of procuring its assistance and favour. For this purpose, I shall first present the reader with what the philosopher Sallust says concerning sacrifices and the honours which were paid to the divinities, in his golden treatise On the Gods and the World. “The honours, says he, which we pay to the Gods are performed for the sake of our advantage; and since the providence of the Gods is every where extended, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and similitude. Hence temples imitate the heavens, but altars the earth; statues resemble life, and on this account they are similar to animals; prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters superior ineffable powers; herbs and stones resemble matter; and animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of our souls. But from all these nothing happens to the Gods beyond what they already possess; for what accession can be made to a divine nature? But a conjunction with our souls and the Gods is by these means produced.
“I think however, it will be proper to add a few things concerning sacrifices. And in the first
- ↑ Και χρη τον επι τας αρχας αναβαινοντα ζητειν, ει δυνατον ειναι τι κρειττον, της υποτεθεισης αρχης κᾳν ευρεθῃ, παλιν επ’ εκεινου ζητειν, εως αν εις τας ακϱοτατας εννοιας ελθωμεν, ων ουκετι σεμνοτερας εχομεν· και μη στησαι την αναβασιν. Ουδε γαρ ευλαβητεον μη κενεμβατωμεν, μειζονα τινα και υπεϱβαινοντα τας πρωτας αρχας περι αυτων εννοουντες. Ου γαρ δυνατον τηλικουτον πηδημα πηδησαι τας ημετεϱας εννοιας, ως παϱισωθηναι τῃ αξιᾳ των πρωτων αϱχων, ου λεγω και υπερπτηναι· μια γαϱ αυτη προς θεον ανατασις αριστη, και ως δυνατον απταιστος. Και ων εννοουμεν αγαθων τα σεμνοτατα, και αγιωτατα, και πϱωτουργα, και ονοματα, και πϱαγματα αυτῳ ανατιθεντας ειδεναι βεβαιως, οτι μηδεν ανατεθεικαμεν αξιον· αϱκει δε ημιν εις συγγνωμην, το μηδεν εχειν εκεινων υπερτερον. Simplic. in Epict. Enchir. p. 207 Lond. 1670. 8vo.
- ↑ Of the first principle, says Damascius (in M. S. περι αρχων) the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it as a darkness beyond all intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness, πρωτην αρχην ανυμνηκασαν, σκοτος υπερ πασαν νοησιν, σκοτος αγνωστον, τρις τουτο επιφημιζοντες.
