“And whereas that noble lord is pleased to aver that he never received any advice from me of my arrival at Madrid with the Portuguese, and (as an argument of my neglect of him on that subject) produces an instance of one officer that happened to pass through his quarters with letters from me to the king, and none to his lordship — I am obliged to observe that I gave this officer 100 pistoles, and ordered him to go directly to the King of Spain, who then lay at Saragossa, but he was accidentally forced to go out of his way to avoid one of the enemy’s parties, which was the true occasion of his passing through the Earl of Peterborow’s quarters at Valencia, contrary to his first intention. But several other officers who were despatched by me to the Earl assured me they had the honour to deliver him those letters which I wrote to his lordship from Madrid and Guadalaxara. And even taking the fact to be as the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to state it himself, it is plain his lordship had at least some verbal informations from that very officer that passed through his lordship’s quarters, and consequently could not be altogether ignorant either of the place where the Portuguese army lay, or of the necessity of joining them without loss of time.
“After the General had got King Charles proclaimed at Madrid, it was thought fit to advance to Guadalaxara, where we had at last advice that the king was coming to join us, and at the same time were informed that the Duke of Anjou was at Guadaraxa, to which place we marched to prevent the enemy from intercepting the king. Upon our approach the Duke of Anjou repassed the river, which little advantage we contented ourselves with, for it was not thought advisable to follow and attack him on the other side, being advantageously posted and stronger than we.
“We stayed here two days, and when we thought the king was out of danger, we again retired to Guadalaxara, where we were joined by his Majesty and my Lord Peterborough, with two regiments of Spanish dragoons, and part of Pearce’s, for his lordship had left behind him in several places thirteen battalions of English foot, with the remainder of Pearce’s and two other entire regiments of dragoons.
"So soon as the armies were joined (having upon my arrival at Madrid sent Captain Montague to give the Queen an account of our march, and to desire her Majesty’s leave to retire), I waited upon my Lord Peterborow, offering him the command of the English, and to receive his orders till I should have the Queen’s leave to go home. But because the Marquis das Minas would not do so too, my Lord Peterborow chose not to stay with the army, and within a few days after went away.
“The king resolved, by advice of the general officers, to go to Chincon, where all things necessary for the army were found in great plenty. But the season being far advanced, a council was held about taking winter quarters, where it was agreed to be by no means safe to canton on that side of the Tagus, for fear of losing all communication with the sea. Besides, the country was so open, the troops could not be divided without danger.
“For these reasons, after having stayed at Chincon about three weeks, though the army had forage and provisions for as many more, it was agreed forthwith to cross the Tagus, lest the approaching rains should render the fords impracticable. Nor was there a possibility of taking winter quarters so commodiously as in the kingdom of Valencia, where the situation of the country rendered us secure against any attempts from a superior army.
“This resolution was put in practice, and we made our retreat in good order, notwithstanding all the interruption the enemy were able to give us, and were obliged at Yniesta to cross the river in the sight of all their cavalry.
“Whilst the army was in quarters, my Lord Peterborow came back from Italy. And whereas it has been suggested that his lordship did then demand from me 5000 men for some expedition on the side of Catalonia, which were refused — I must declare I do not remember that the Earl ever applied himself to me in particular upon that subject. If he had, the answer must naturally have been, that that matter depended not upon me to grant or refuse, but upon the King of Spain under whose command I was.
“But I do remember the Earl proposed this at some general council, or council of war, held in the king’s presence about the operations of the ensuing campaign, and joined with those who were of opinion that it was by no means convenient to divide the troops, as may appear by a copy of that opinion signed by my Lord Tyrawley and by me, bearing date the 15th day of January 1706-7. But I must beg leave to observe that it was not the decisive council for the operations of the campaign, for many subsequent councils were held in the king’s presence more important than this. And though in them there might have been some variety of opinions as to the manner, yet almost all the generals and ministers that assisted at those councils agreed perfectly in the substance, which was, that we should join our troops and march to Madrid. Some indeed were for passing through the plains of the Mancha, and crossing the Tagus; but this opinion was overruled, because of the hazard in passing the river if the enemy opposed us, and of the scarcity of provisions in the Mancha, which had been exhausted by the enemy’s winter quarters. For which reasons it was, after many debates, agreed, that we should take the way of Valencia and Arragon, passing the Tagus at its head, to avoid all opposition. But lest the kingdom of Valencia might by this means be any ways exposed, it was likewise resolved, before we should begin our march, to destroy all the enemy’s magazines of provision and forage, in the country bordering upon the frontiers of Valencia, to prevent them from making incursions. And I do take upon me to aver, that nothing was ever transacted, during the time I had the honour to command the Queen’s troops, contrary to the
