positive resolutions of any general council or council of war, unless that resolution was afterwards repealed by some subsequent council.
“So sensible was every one of our being already too weak, it was resolved to desire my Lord Rivers (who was lately arrived at Lisbon) would join us with the troops that came under his command from England; which his lordship did, not long after.
“For the better execution of what had been resolved for our march through Valencia and Arragon, proper commissaries and officers were despatched to provide bread and forage sufficient for the troops, in all places where it was designed the army should pass. I went with the Marquis das Minas to the frontiers towards the latter end of March, and we took the field the beginning of April. We ruined part of the country bordering upon the frontiers of Valencia before the enemy could join their troops, particularly Yecla, where they had their largest magazines. Judging it necessary to take in the Castle of Villena, to prevent their army from being masters of one of the most considerable inlets into the kingdom of Valencia, we sat down before that place. But it proved stronger than was expected; and after we had spent some days there, we had notice that the enemy had assembled their troops at Almanza.
“Upon this advice a council of war was held, where it was unanimously resolved to fight the enemy, which we were the rather induced to, because it was judged impossible to subsist upon the defensive in the kingdom of Valencia. The country had already been so much exhausted by our winter quarters, that there was not two days’ provisions to be found for the army; and we could not have been able to have subsisted there so long as we did, but for the supply we found in the enemy’s magazines at Yecla. Nor did we think it proper to pursue the once-intended march through that kingdom and Arragon, lest provisions should be wanting, leaving the enemy so near and in a condition to follow us. For though commissaries had been employed, there was reason to apprehend that the towns we were to pass through would shut their gates against us, whilst we were closely followed by the enemy, and persecuted by the peasants of the country, who, grown desperate by seeing themselves abandoned, would naturally be up in arms in the mountains. Besides, we had certain advice that there was already a body of French troops, consisting of 8000 men, in Spain, and upon their march to reinforce the enemy. Thus, as the army must inevitably have perished without fighting, it was thought reasonable to run the hazard of a battle, wherein we had an equal chance to come off victors, which was accordingly done two days after, on the 25th of April 1707, N. S., but with ill success.
“The cavalry of the allies, with some small part of the foot that had escaped the ill fate of the day, joined again at Alcira, from whence they retired to Tortosa, and finding the enemy had crossed the Ebro, endeavoured, by opposing their passage over the Chinca, to amuse them till the latter end of the campaign. Meantime, with great expedition, I gathered the broken remains of the foot (out of which I formed five battalions) and raised four more of Catalans, with which we made a stand against a victorious enemy, and preserved the principality of Catalonia entire, except Lerida. After the taking of Lerida, the enemy thought fit to retire into winter quarters, and we did the same.
“In February following, the Marquis das Minas, with most of the Portuguese generals, embarked for Lisbon; and having the Queen’s leave to do so too, I visited the several quarters where the troops in her Majesty’s pay were lodged; and having left the necessary orders with Majors-General Carpenter and Wills for the government in my absence, took the same opportunity of going thither.
“Upon my arrival in Portugal, I found the Queen’s orders there to take upon me the characters of ambassador extraordinary, plenipotentiary, and general of her forces, which charges I accepted in obedience to her Majesty; though I had nothing so much at heart as the pleasure of returning to that retirement, from whence only the Queen’s positive commands could have drawn me.”
(2.) The Earl of Galway’s Reply, or Observations upon the Earl of Peterborow’s Answers to the five questions proposed to his Lordship by the Lords.
“Your lordships having been pleased to allow me a copy of all such papers as have been produced to prove the truth of the Earl of Peterborow’s answers to the five questions that were proposed to him by this honourable house, together with a copy of those questions and answers, with leave to answer to any such part thereof as I might conceive myself concerned in, and have not already sufficiently explained in my narrative, I do take the liberty of observing to your lordships, that
“The Earl of Peterborow, to the first question,[1] is pleased to say, ‘The management of the war in Spain, when under the conduct of other generals, was not only supported with great numbers of men and vast sums of money, but also with notorious falsehoods published in their favour, to excuse repeated disgraces.’ Whereas his lordship cannot but remember, that when he sailed from Portugal with the King of Spain to Barcelona, he left only one regiment of horse and five of foot under my command in that country, I having voluntarily
- ↑ First Question: “The Earl of Peterborow be desired to acquaint the Committee how he was supported with men and money during the time he commanded in Spain, and what applications he made for either, and to whom?”
