join us, he brought no more English troops with him than one regiment of dragoons and a detachment of another, though he had actually at that time under his command in Spain 13 English battalions and 4 regiments of dragoons. As, likewise, that the officer who (his lordship says) passed through his quarters with letters for the King of Spain and none for him, was never designed to have gone within several leagues of his lordship, unless he had been obliged to it by a party of the enemy (as I have already explained more largely in my Narrative). And I cannot help observing, ’tis very improbable that officer should have had occasion to apply to the Earl’s secretary for money, because I gave him 100 pistoles at the time I dispatched him.
“In his lordship’s answer to the third question,[1] he is pleased to say, ‘That the Earl of Galway continued about 40 days at Madrid without making any endeavours to augment his troops, or provide any means for the subsistence of his army; that meeting the enemy unexpectedly and retreating to the camp of Guadalaxara, the troops were without provisions and in the greatest disorder.’ In reply to this paragraph I do affirm, that the Portuguese staid no longer time at Madrid than was necessary co get the king proclaimed there, which did not exceed ten days, — then advanced as far as Guadalaxara, and afterwards to Guadaraxa, about 60 miles beyond Madrid, where we obliged part of the Duke of Anjou’s troops to repass the river, — but were not willing to engage them, at a time when we had reason to expect we should have been joined in a few days by the forces with the King of Spain and Earl of Peterborow, which was the only secure method left us to augment our troops. For it would have been very imprudent to have attempted to have formed corps of the Castilians, who were entirely devoted to the Duke of Anjou’s interest. But all the officers of the army know, we were so far from wanting provisions ourselves, that we sent a convoy of 8000 loaves to meet the king and the Earl of Peterborow, which (by their delay in not advancing fast enough) grew mouldy, and was afterwards pillaged by the peasants. His lordship’s information of our want of intelligence of the enemy’s motions and of our disorder upon the retreat, are as great mistakes as the former. For the occasion of our advancing to Guadaraxa was purely to post ourselves in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from marching or sending detachments to intercept the King of Spain; and when we had reason to believe him out of danger, we returned to Guadalaxara, there to be joined by the King and the Earl of Peterborow. Nor was it possible for his lordship to have seen our disorder, if there had been any, because (as I have already observed) he came not to Guadalaxara himself till some days after we had been encamped there.
“Notwithstanding, the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to say, ‘That we lost 5000 men in the retreat to Valencia without a blow, and entirely ruined our whole cavalry.’ ’Tis certain our loss upon that occasion was very inconsiderable, if any, and the retreat made in so good order, that the enemy (superior as they were in number) never durst venture to attack us after the warm reception 22 of their squadrons met with from two battalions under the command of Colonel Wade, in the town of Villa Nova, notwithstanding we were obliged to cross plains and rivers in their view.
“And though his lordship avers in his answer to this question, ‘That this retreat was made against the king’s opinion, and that of all his officers and ministers’ — it is certain, the retreat was concerted and agreed upon at a council of war. ’Tis true some persons about the King seemed, at first, inclinable to have taken quarters in Castile, but that was soon after found impracticable; for none of those Spaniards who were best acquainted with the country could make a disposition of quarters where the troops could be secure. Therefore it was resolved immediately to cross the Tagus, before the approaching rains should have rendered the fords impracticable; which being done, our next design was to have lodged ourselves behind the river Xucar. But neither could this be done without taking a small town with a castle upon that river, that commanded a bridge, where the enemy had a garrison. And therefore a disposition was made for attacking this town; but by the delay of the king’s generals the execution of this matter was so long deferred, that the enemy had already reinforced their garrison, and were advanced so near us with a superior force, that it was not thought advisable to attempt the place. Thus the only resource left us was the kingdom of Valencia, whither we were absolutely obliged to retreat, that we might preserve our communication with the seas, and canton with security.
“Nor is it to be wondered at that Count Noyelles, in his letter to the Earl of Peterborow, should seem dissatisfied with the measures that were then taken; since ’tis well known that General used underhand to ridicule those very opinions of councils of war to which he had given his own assent. For, being disappointed of the command of the army (which was what he expected at his first arrival), he seemed resolved that no other general should have an army to command. ’Tis very notorious that a Dutch and Spanish battalion, with a detachment of English and Portuguese, amounting to above 3000 men, were sent to Cuenca, and thrown away there (after it had been resolved to retreat to Valencia), purely to satisfy his importunity; for I always foresaw it would be impossible to protect a garrison at that distance from our quarters. But what is still more extraordinary, the sending of the king’s troops into Arragon
- ↑ Third Question: “That the Earl of Peterborow acquaint the House, what advice his lordship received from the Karl of Galway at Madrid in order to concert any public measures, and what his lordship knows of the reasons that induced the King of Spain to go by Arragon towards Madrid, and not by Valencia?”
