offered him, and he as freely accepted of, two regiments of dragoons from Portugal, and four battalions of foot from Gibraltar, which I had sent to the defence of that place.
“I declare I never traduced the said Earl’s conduct either by letters or otherwise, though it seems the Queen had been fully informed thereof, particularly in regard to the misunderstanding between his lordship and the King of Spain, to which his Catholic Majesty has attributed his delays in marching to his capital, as may appear by Count Gallas’s memorial, a copy whereof lies on your Lordships’ table. ’Tis well known, the first ‘disgrace’ that ever happened to us in Spain was occasioned by his lordship’s not joining us in time at Madrid; and all the misfortunes that attended us afterwards were owing to that neglect.
“His lordship is pleased to say further, in his answer to the same question, ‘That to excuse the fatal battle of Almanza a king was to be used at that rate as to have it, in an account printed by authority, declared that he took numbers, amounting to 4000 or 5000 men, from a battle to be fought for his crown, the very regiments of horse and foot mentioned by name. Whereas it is notoriously known to the whole world that he took only about 200 miserable Spanish dragoons; and that of the regiments mentioned to be taken away from the English general in Valencia, some were never in being, others were regiments of trained bands in Barcelona, and none of them within 250 miles of that place.’ Whereupon I beg leave to observe, that notwithstanding the Earl’s reflection on that paper published by authority, the account therein printed is so far from having been exaggerated, that there were actually some battalions of regular troops absent in Catalonia besides those mentioned in the Gazette, June 1707; and several officers who were at Almanza can depose that there was not one Spanish corps, either horse, foot, or dragoons, on our side at that battle.
“If part of the king’s forces were at 250 miles’ distance, that may be a reason why they could not be at the battle; but none can be given for their being at that distance, except in the case of some few garrisons, which might indeed have been necessary, but could not require above six or seven battalions whilst the army was then in the field. Whereas his Catholic Majesty had at that time in his own pay in Spain above 6000 men, besides the Dutch and English that were in Arragon and Catalonia. And those regiments which the Earl is pleased to call ‘trained bands,’[1] because they bore the name of some particular town or province that raised or subsisted them, are no more so than the regiments of Picardy and Burgundy in France, though newly raised.
“In his lordship’s answer to the second question,[2] he is pleased to aver, ‘That from the time the Earl of Galway came first into Spain as far as Almaras, and thence returned back to Portugal, the Earl of Peterborow had no advices from the Earl of Galway, no account of the motives of that retreat, or any hopes given him of the return of the Portuguese into Spain.’ What his lordship says upon this occasion is very true, for whilst he was at so great a distance besieged in Barcelona, and the Duke of Berwick with a considerable body of horse between him and us, it was to no purpose to think of sending despatches by land. Neither was it necessary to inform the enemy that way, that the Portuguese were resolved (notwithstanding the repeated instances of the foreign generals to the contrary) to return back again to their own country, after their army had advanced as far as the bridge of Almaras. But when we got to Madrid, I immediately sent so many expresses with letters both to the Earl of Peterborow and the King of Spain, that it was morally impossible his lordship could have been ignorant above eight days of our arrival there. And I have been since assured by the inhabitants of Barcelona, that they were all informed of it by that time; from whence I must conclude that his lordship’s delays in joining us were voluntary, and not occasioned by want of intelligence. I have asserted in the narrative which I delivered in to this most honourable house, that I do verily believe, if the Portuguese army had been joined in time after their arrival at Madrid by the forces with the King of Spain and under the command of the Earl of Peterborow, we might have been able to have driven the Duke of Anjou out of Spain, and have put an end to an expensive war; nor was this my opinion only, but that of all the world at that time. And I find his lordship thinks it so far imports him to be clear of this imputation, that he is resolved to be rid of it at any rate. For certainly nothing less than an apprehension of this nature could have made him aver a fact so improbable as that where, in his farther answer to the same question he says, ‘That he received no letter, no message from the Earl of Galway after his second entrance into Spain, nor had the least notice of his situation, circumstances, or designs, till he saw his troops retreating from the enemy to take the strong camp of Guadalaxara.’
“Now what could be the design of his lordship’s marching to Guadalaxara, with so small a body of troops as is mentioned in my Narrative, unless he knew he was to meet us there? Besides, his lordship forgets that he came not to Guadalaxara till some days after the Portuguese had been actually encamped there, as I can make appear by the oath of several officers; and consequently it was impossible for him to have seen us retreating thither.
“I believe it may be necessary upon this occasion to repeat, that when his lordship did
- ↑ [This was an old name for yeomanry regiments or militia.]
- ↑ Second Question: “The Earl of Peterborow may acquaint the house of what he knows of the Earl of Galway’s proceedings during his stay with the army at Madrid, his march to Guadalaxara, and his retreat to Valencia, and if he knows anything of the opposition made by the King of Spain, the Count De Noyelles, and the Spanish ministers and generals to those measures.”
