Alito, J., dissenting
interpretation of Article 64 that the court had unanimously adopted on April 12, 2017. Goertz, on the other hand, argues that Reed’s claim accrued no later than the date of the CCA’s April 12 decision, and because that date preceded the federal lawsuit by more than two years, Goertz maintains that we should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision that Reed’s complaint was filed too late.
As I will explain, there is room for debate about exactly when Reed’s DNA testing claim accrued, but in my view, the notion that this did not take place until rehearing was denied is clearly wrong.
I
Before getting to the nub of this case, I briefly explain why Reed’s claim might have accrued even earlier than April 12, 2017. First, it can be argued that Reed’s claim against Goertz accrued on or before July 2014, when Goertz initially refused Reed’s testing request.[1] The general rule is that a plaintiff’s §1983 claim against a state official for violating a constitutional right accrues when the alleged violation takes place. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 384 (§1983 claim “normally commence[s] to run” from when wrong occurs). And the Court does not disclaim the possibility that a plaintiff could file a §1983 claim as soon as a state prosecutor denies a DNA testing request. See ante, at 6, and n. 1.
Another possibility is that the particular claim Reed now asserts did not accrue until the state trial court held that Goertz had properly denied Reed’s testing request. Reed does not claim that the bare text of Article 64 is unconstitutional. (Had he done so, he could hardly argue, as he does
- ↑ We are told that Reed and Goertz engaged in lengthy negotiations about the testing of certain items prior to the date in July 2014 when Reed filed his claim in the District Court of Bastrop County under Article 64. Brief for Petitioner 13; Brief for Respondent 5–6; see Reed v. State, 541 S. W. 3d 759, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
