Page:Reed v. Goertz.pdf/31

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
3

Alito, J., dissenting

now, that his claim did not accrue until the end of the appellate process.) Instead, he stresses that his claim concerns the state courts’ construction of that statute and in particular, their holding that the evidence for which testing is sought must not be contaminated. Brief for Petitioner 3, 15, 29. In response to this argument, Goertz contends that every allegedly unconstitutional aspect of the judicial interpretation of the statute was adopted by the time the state trial court issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in 2016, and Goertz therefore takes the position that Reed’s unconstitutional-construction claim accrued at that time. Brief for Respondent 18–19.

II
A

For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether Reed’s claim accrued on either of these two dates. We need only decide whether accrual was put off until the CCA denied rehearing, and it is clear to me that this delayed accrual date is wrong.[1] As noted, the claim that Reed asserts is not based on the bare text of Article 64, but on what he claims is an erroneous interpretation of that provision by the Texas courts. He thus submits that his claim accrued when the “authoritative construction of Article 64” that he challenges was pronounced by the CCA. Brief for Petitioner 17.


  1. We have noted that a couple special cases can displace that “presumptiv[e]” accrual rule, such as where “a particular claim may not realistically be brought while a violation is ongoing,” or where a special accrual rule governed “the most natural common-law analogy.” McDonough v. Smith, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4). But the majority (correctly) does not adopt Reed’s view, see Brief for Petitioner 32–39, that this matter raises one of those special cases. Under Reed’s theory as expressed as argument, he could have proceeded with a claim under Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521 (2011), at any time in the process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12 (stating that “a prisoner could exit the state court procedures at any point” and bring a challenge).